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SUSAN MORGAN 
A STUDY OF AMERICAN -ISRAELI RELATIONS 1967-73 
M.A. 
1995 
The War of June 1967 proved to be instrumental in changing the 
perceptions of the principal protagonists i n the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
also the major powers outside the region. The preemptive strike 
launched by Israel on 6 June began a comprehensive defeat of the Arab 
states, and i n just six days Israel increased her size threefold, 
incorporating large portions of Arab land into her territory. The changes 
that occurred can be briefly summed up as follows: 
• Soviet influence wi th in the Arab states increased w i t h military 
advisers sent to Egypt and Syria i n great ntmibers to help 
reconstruct the defeated armies (despite the fact that Soviet 
armaments had failed to avoid a convincing Israeli victory). 
• Israel's confidence both i n her own strength and i n her ability to 
survive increased. 
• The idea that Israel could act as a "strategic asset" became a f i rmly 
established tenet of American foreign policy 
IrorucaUy, relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab states, 
who backed them, were strengthened after the defeat inflicted by Israel. 
On a practical level, the Soviet Un ion embarked upon a massive 
programme of military and economic support for the Arab states, quickly 
replacing the amoimt of military hardware that had been lost i n the war. 
The Soviet newspaper "Izvestia" suggested that the Arab states realised 
that only: 
"through reliance upon the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries, can they abolish completely imperialist influence in the 
Middle East and achieve Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied 
Territories"! 
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INTRODUCTION 
H o w d i d America's relationship w i t h Israel evolve? Why is the 
Jewish lobby such a powerful interest group in American politics? What 
effect d i d the 1967 and 1973 wars have on the future of American-Israeli 
relations? These are some of the questions that this study sets out to 
address. The study focuses on the per iod 1967-73 and aims to 
demonstrate understanding of a number of key themes including: 
• The changes i n the international order that took place following 
the second wor ld war, and the way in which these shaped 
America's increasing influence i n the Middle East. 
• The importance of superpower relations in shaping American 
Middle Eastern policy. 
• The widespread support that exists for Israel wi th in the United 
States and the reasons for this. 
• The influence of the Jewish lobby in American politics. 
• The pivotal importance that the 1967 war had, not only in terms of 
American-Israeli relations, but also Arab on perceptions of Israel. 
• The effects the 1973 war had on American-Israeli relations, and 
. Israel's relationship w i t h the Arab states. 
The study is divided into three parts; American-Israeli relations 
prior to 1967; the different political systems and culture that exist i n the 
United States and Israel; the chronology of events in the 1967-73 period. 
I n the first part, the historical context of the relationship is examined, 
inc luding the establishment of the state of Israel, and the issues facing 
the United States at the end of the Second Wor ld War. This section 
looks i n some detail at the choices that confronted America and the way 
that her expanding role i n the Middle East was i n many ways indicative 
of her enhanced posit ion i n w o r l d affairs i n the post war period. 
Essential background informat ion is provided concerning the support 
the Uiuted States offered Israel f r o m the 1940s and the reasons why the 
scale of assistance increased. 
Part two of the study focuses on the parameters set by the different 
political systems and culture i n the two countries. The Jewish lobby is 
examined i n detail, as wel l as the reasons behind the strong support that 
exists for Israel i n the United States. There were a ntmiber of key factors 
influencing the formation of Israeli policy i n the pre-1967 period, many 
of wh ich remained after the Six Day War. These are identif ied and 
explained. 
I n the f ina l section, the chronology of the six year period is 
examined, and the pressures that influenced policy making i n the United 
States and Israel during this time are explained. The section begins 
w i t h an int roduct ion that examines the importance of the 1967 war, 
wh ich is subsequently described i n detail i n the f irs t chapter. The 
consequences of the war are also analysed including: 
• The role that the United States now believed Israel could f u l f i l i n 
the Middle East 
• The reaction of the Arab States to their defeat 
• The increase i n Soviet influence i n the Middle East 
• The way in which the political elite in Israel reacts to the choices 
that i t now faces over the future of the Occupied Territories. 
Af te r numerous peace initiatives, the focus moved to the importance of 
detente and the increasing frustrat ion of the Arab states as the peace 
process stalled. The result of this, the 1973 war and its consequences are 
explained. The study ends w i t h a consideration of the fu ture 
implications for the relationship given the outcome of the 1973 war. 
There were a number of limitations which made the completion 
of this thesis more diff icul t . M y lack of Arabic and Hebrew meant I was 
confined to sources i n English. I n addition there were significant time 
constraints once I had finished the one year f u l l time study. The thesis 
was completed whilst working fvill time i n London, which made liaison 
w i t h my supervisor more d i f f i cu l t than i t might otherwise have been, 
and the time which I could devote to the study was very much at the 
mercy of work pressures. 
I have used a library based approach supplemented by interviews 
and discussions w i t h a number of experts on the field. The bibliography 
indicates the range of quanti ty of pr imary and secondary sources 
consulted i n the preparation of this thesis. 
PART ONE 
AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS: 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The Birth of Israel 
Changes in International Politics in the Postwar Period 
PART ONE 
A M E R I C A N - I S R A E L I 
R E L A T I O N S : 
T H E H I S T O R I C A L CONTEXT 
The conflict has not lasted for thousands of 
years as is often said. It is very much a product 
of our twentieth century...Only when Ottoman 
rule had given way to the British mandate and 
the prospect of self determination for Palestine 
emerged, d i d the Arab and the Jew, after 
having coexisted peacefully for generations, 
begin their mortal struggle over the political 
future of this land. 
Henry Kissinger 
THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL 
The purpose of this first section is to look briefly at the events that 
surrounded the creation of the state of Israel. By examining the context 
of the creation of the state of Israel, the background to the development 
of American-Israeli relations w i l l be established. Several areas i n 
particular w i l l be examined: 
• The problems experienced by the British during the time they held 
the mandate over Palestine. 
• The response of the U N to the growing crisis i n Palestine. 
• The pressures that coincided to enable the bir th of Israel. 
I n the years that fol lowed the first wor ld war, Britain and France 
remained the dominant powers i n the Middle East region. In 1920 the 
Bri t i sh mandate over Palestine was established w i t h the fo l lowing 
objectives: 
• To give effect to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, by promoting the wel l being and development of people 
i n the mandate territory and provisionally recognising Palestine as 
an independent nation. 
• To put into effect the Balfour declaration which stated Britain's 
support for: 
"the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for 
the Jewish people"! 
These two objectives2 d id not rest easily together. The vast majority of 
people i n Palestine at this time were Arabs and were therefore opposed 
to the Bal four Declarat ion, w h i c h stated as its in tent ion, the 
estabhshment of a Jewish homeland, i n lands which had been in Arab 
hands for generations. 
Given these objectives, the Brit ish position was contradictory 
throughout the period. Dur ing the 1930s, i t became increasingly clear 
that Britain's Palestine policy could no longer give f u l l support to the 
Jewish claims w i t h o u t damaging Arab interests and therefore 
antagonising Arab states, something that Britain wanted to avoid. (In 
1939, the Bri t ish introduced a White Paper designed to restrict the 
nimibers of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, but i t was defeated.) I n light 
of this, Zionist groups looked increasingly to the United States for 
support. 
Traditionally, the US had been viewed favourably by the Arab 
States. The absence of imperial involvement saw her viewed as the 
champion of self determination and democratic freedoms. Prior to the 
second w o r l d war, American involvement i n the Middle East had been 
l imi ted to commercial interests. But rising Zionist expectations w i t h 
regard to her stance on Palestine accurately reflected her increasing 
international importance. A n d there was some evidence to suggest that 
the Uni ted States w o u l d favour the Zionist case. I n 1922, a Joint 
Resolution of Congress had stated: 
"that the United States favours the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" 3 
I n many ways, the outcome of the second wor ld war served to 
strengthen the trends that were apparent towards the end of the 1930s: 
• US interest i n the region, and irifluence internationally increased 
substantially. (In 1946 there was a joint Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry to consider the problem of Palestine). 
• Jewish immigration to Palestine increased greatly. 
• British influence i n the area was reduced. 
Economically, the second w o r l d war placed great pressure on 
Britain and consequently she was no longer i n a position to maintain her 
imperial interests. This contrasted greatly to the position of the Uruted 
States i n 1945, whose influence and wor ld standing increased rapidly i n 
the postwar period, as d id her interest i n the Middle East. There were 
two reasons for this: 
• The strategic importance of the Middle East i n its proximity to 
Russia. (This was particularly important i n the postwar period, 
w i t h the onset of the Cold War.) 
• The importance of oil . 4 
Having fai led to f i n d an adequate solution to the problems in 
Palestine and as a result of her reduced economic strength, Britain 
declared a desire to relinquish her responsibilities i n the area. I n 
response to this, i n 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) was appointed to investigate Jewish and Palestinian 
claims i n the area and the United States became formally involved i n the 
search for a solution to the problem of Palestine. A t this time, two 
events coincided to increase the support of the Zionist case in the USA: 
• The feeling of guilt about the treatment of Jews in Germany in the 
second wor ld war, as illustrated by Trvraian: 
"My purpose was then and later, to bring about the 
redemption of the Balfour Declaration and the rescue of 
at least some of the victims of Nazism. I was not 
committed to any particular time schedule for its 
accomplishment. The American policy was designed to 
bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of the 
promised Jewish homeland and ease access to it for the 
displaced Jews of Europe"^ 
• The domestic political agenda in the USA was dominated by 
forthcoming Congressional elections. Governor Mead and 
Senator Lehman were doing badly i n the local campaign in New 
York and i t was hoped that Truman's support of the Jewish 
Agency proposal for: 
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"the creation of a viable Jew i^sh state in control of its ov^ n 
immigration and economic pohcies in an adequate area of 
Palestine"6 
would w i n the Jewish bloc vote i n New York. 
The UNSCOP was d iv ided i n its f indings, w i t h two reports 
published. The minor i ty report, supported by three members of the 
committee, India, I ran and Yugoslavia advocated an extension of the 
British mandate for a further three years, followed by the creation of an 
independent federation of Arab and Jewish states. The majority report 
recommended an immediate and more drastic solution to the problem; 
part i t ion (the details of which are shown in f i g 1 overleaf). This was 
advocated by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, 
Peru, Sweden and Uruguay. Palestine was to be divided into an Arab 
state, a Jewish state and the City of Jerusalem. There was to be a two year 
transitional per iod dur ing wh ich time the U K w o u l d continue the 
administration of Palestine under the auspices of the U N . 
Despite the rejection of both reports by the Arabs, on the grounds 
that they were against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of 
Palestine, the par t i t ion proposal was accepted, and this led to an 
escalation of violence i n Palestine. A t the time the reports were 
published, the United States was again involved i n elections, this time 
presidential. The American endorsement of the UNSCOP partition plan 
on 11 November 1947 was given probably because Truman saw it as the 
most practical solution at the time which also had Jewish support. In 
the for thcoming election. President Truman's top polit ical advisers. 
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F i g l THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION PLAN 1947 
LEBANON 
Haifa 
Mediterranean 
Sea 
Sinai 
TRANS-
JORDAN 
Tel Aviv 
Hebron Dead 
SYRIA 
The Proposed Jewish State 
The Proposed Arab State 
Jerusalem and its suburbs: to be an 
international zone 
J R Gainsborough, The Arab Israeli Conflict, Aldershot, Gower 
Publishing Co. 1986, p 307 
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David Niles and Clark CUfford believed that the Jewish vote in the State 
of New York could prove crucial. (The first pol l of American Jewry 
conducted by Elmo Roper i n 1945 regarding the establishment of an 
Israeli state showed 80% supported it7). Consequently, they campaigned 
strenuously for Truman to adopt a favourable approach to the Ziorust 
case. Al though i n previous years, David Niles had been the dr iving 
force behind this, by the r tm up to the election i t was Cl i f ford who was 
the more influential of the presidential advisers. On 12 May 1948, i n a 
meeting to discuss what action w o u l d be taken i f Israel declared 
independence, C l i f fo rd put forward the Zionist case. One participant, 
Robert McClintock later commented that: 
"Clifford argued entirely on grounds of domestic 
politics"8 
The United Nations decision to favour the partit ion of Palestine 
can be seen as a "springboard" towards Israeli independence. I n the 
postwar period rising Jewish w i l l to see an independent state established 
coincided w i t h consistent international support to provide legitimisation 
for the creation of the state of Israel. Britain terminated the mandate 
over Palestine on 14 May 1948, and the United States gave almost instant 
recognition to the Israeli state that was successfully created f rom the 
vacuum left by Britain's departure f r o m Palestine. America's leading 
role i n providing international recognition for the new state was crucial 
and i n subsequent years i t was to the United States that Israel looked for 
support. 
The focus of the next section w i l l be the years 1948-1966 and the 
13 
way i n which American-Israeli relations developed in the early days of 
the new state. 
NOTES: 
1. J Pratt, V DeSantis & J Siracusa, A History of United States Foreign 
Policy. New Jersey, Prentice Hall Inc. 1980, p481 
2. HCattan, Palestine, The Arabs & Israel. The Search For Justice, 
London, Longmans, 1969, p 18 
3. CRubenberg, Israel A n d The American National Interest. A 
Critical Examination, Urbana & Chicago, University of lUinois 
Press, 1986, p27 
4. K Roosevelt, 'The Partition Of Palestine. A Lesson In Pressure 
Polities', Middle East Totirnal vol 2, 1948, p 8 
5. CRubenberg, (1986), p 3 1 
6. K Roosevelt, 'The Partition of Palestine. A Lesson In Presstire 
Polities', Middle East Journal vol 2, 1948, p 12 
7. J Stork & S Rose, 'Zionism and American Jewry', Journal of 
Palestine Studies, vol 3, 1973, p 4 1 
8. J Snetsinger, Truman, The Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel, 
Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1974, p 108 
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CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE POST 
WARPERIOD 
As stated i n the previous section, a number of factors came 
together to increase America's interest i n the Middle East, the most 
significant of those being the onset of the Cold War and the perceived 
threat that the USSR posed to the region. This chapter w i l l examine the 
ways i n which international politics changed in the period fo l lowing 
1945, and the effects that these changes had, i n relation to America's 
Middle East policy and specifically towards Israel. 
The f o r e i g n po l icy opt ions of the U n i t e d States were 
fundamentally altered as a result of the outcome of the second wor ld 
war. Involvement i n the first wor ld war had been followed by a return to 
isolatioiusm and a wi thdrawal f r o m international affairs, but 1945 saw 
radical changes i n the existing international order. The European 
cotmtries that had played an important part on the wor ld stage prior to 
1945 found themselves under increasing economic strain i n the period 
fo l lowing the end of the war. Consequently, America found herself 
playing a new key role i n the post 1945 era. In the words of Kissinger: 
"The period after World War II marks the first era of 
truly global foreign policy".! 
The wart ime co-operation that had existed between the United 
States and the USSR was replaced by suspicion. There are numerous 
contending hypotheses as to the origins of the Cold War, including that 
put forward by Spanier, that the power vacuum i n Europe that followed 
15 
Germany's defeat, enabled the USSR to increase her power and influence 
i n the postwar period.2 Increasingly, the wor ld became aligned into 
Communist and non-Communist spheres, as Russia expanded into 
Eastern and Centra l Europe. Consequently, postwar American 
diplomacy rested on the fol lowing premises: 
• The Soviet Union was an expansionist nation 
• The Soviet goal was wor ld domination 
• As leader of the "free wor ld" , the United States was the only 
nation able to stop Soviet aggression 
• Force must be met wi th force 
• The fate of the wor ld was determined by superpower relations 3 
I n 1947, George Kennan was the first to articulate what was to be 
adopted as the strategy of containment. Kerman focused on the USSR as 
a hostile nation and that the US response to this antagonism would need 
to be a: 
"long term, patient, but firm and vigilant containmenf 4 
He described the perceptions of Communism i n the following terms: 
"that the outside world was hostile and that it was their 
duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond 
their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and 
tradition reached up to sustain them in this feehng. 
Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect 
to the outside world began to find its own reaction..." 5 
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To some extent, this change i n American policy resulted f r o m 
Britain's decision that she could no longer protect Greece and Turkey. 
The threat that Communism posed became a widely accepted tenet of 
American poli t ical philosophy, and combating this perceived threat 
assumed considerable importance i n the postwar foreign policy of the 
United States. The Truman Doctrine, embodied this belief, as illustrated 
below: 
"1 believe that it must be the policy of the United States 
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures"^ 
As America became central to the f ight against the spread of 
Communism her foreign policies were described thus: 
"The foreign policies based on unambiguous efforts to 
foster American and Western value systems in the face of 
Soviet attacks may be characterised as rational 
interventionism." 7 
I t was i n this atmosphere that the first attempts were made to use 
foreign assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. The Marshall Plan 
launched after the end of the war saw considerable American aid 
invested i n the economic rebviilding of Europe, beginning w i t h Greece 
and Turkey, where money, troops and civilians were sent to help in the 
postwar effort. General Marshall described the Plan i n these terms: 
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"its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in 
the world so as to permit the emergence of political and 
social conditions in which free institutions can exisf'S 
Events i n Eastern Europe (for example the Communist seizure of 
power i n Czechoslovakia i n February 1948) helped to foster the growth of 
foreign aid as an anti-communist measure. The increasing wor ld stature 
of the USSR was fundamental to the development of foreign aid 
programmes. Such a perceived threat to American security interests 
helped to provide support fo r the expansion of American influence 
abroad. A n d foreign assistance was seen as a crucial way in which this 
could be achieved. I n 1986, R W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State 
said foreign assistance programmes: 
"provide critical reinforcement to policies and 
institutions that the US is committed to support in 
principle as a global power exerting ii\fluence to protect 
legitimate interests"^ 
The degree to which American Foreign Assistance has been extended is 
demonstrated i n the table overleaf: 
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Table 1 
US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 1946-85 
DESCRIPTION ECONOMIC MILITARY TOTAL 
Total economic / 
military assistance 
fiscal years 1946-85 186,509.0 112,791.0 299,300.0 
Total other US 
loans/grants fiscal 
years 1946-85 54,809.0 54,809.0 
(Dollars in millions) 
Source: The Politics of Foreign Aid, M Rabie. 1988, p44 
As Table 1 demonstrates, foreign assistance programmes tend to be 
largely separated into two distinct categories; the Economic Development 
Programmes designed to offer the means to achieve economic growth, 
and Mil i tary and Security Assistance, relating to the defence capabilities 
of the countries involved. 
Three main aims were pursued by the United States i n the Middle 
East: 
Access to the oil located there (it is estimated that Saudi Arabia 
holds 25% of the world's oil reserves). 
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• The control of Soviet expansionism in the region (but also the 
avoidance of superpower conflict). 
• The survival and secvirity of Israel. 
The onset of the Cold War i n the post 1945 period d id much to 
foster American concern regarding the proximity of the Soviet Uruon to 
such a strategically important region as the Middle East. Indeed the 
second and th i rd aims above are l inked, w i t h Soviet expansionism 
checked through the survival and sectirity of Israel. 
Af t e r the Declaration of Independence establishing the Jewish 
State i n 1948, Israel required considerable assistance. I n 1949, the United 
States responded to this, beginning an aid programme w i t h $100 mil l ion 
f r o m the Import-Export Bank which was supplemented two years later by 
a fur ther 35 m i l l i o n dollars loan f r o m the same source. 50% went 
towards agricultural development and 50% to establish Israeli industry. 
From its inception, Israel received considerable financial assistance f rom 
America which enabled the Israeli government to pursue an economic 
strategy w i t h a number of goals including the development of industries 
and agriculture and the attraction of capital investment and private 
enterprises.! 0 
I n 1952, the level of aid was extended through the establishment of 
a series of economic grants and also the Food For Peace Program 
designed to ease the shortages that had resulted i n rationing i n some 
areas. I n the period 1952-73, $635 mi l l ion of US wheat, dairy products, 
fats and oils were transferred to Israel.n The scale of economic assistance 
provided by the United States is demonstrated by the following table: 
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Table 2 
US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL 
1949-76 
YEAR TOTAL GRANT L O A N 
1949-50 _ _ _ 
1951 0.1 0.1 -
1952 86.4 86.4 -
1955 52.7 21.9 30.8 
1962 70.7 1.9 68.8 
1967 6.1 0.6 5.5 
1968 51.8 0.5 51.3 
1972 104.2 50.4 53.8 
1976 782.0 525.0 257.0 
(Dollars in miUions) 
Source: M Rabie, (1988), p59 
I n contrast to the supply of economic aid, miUtary aid was less 
forthcoming. The 1950s saw a period of "evenhandedness" which can be 
illustrated wel l by the Tripartite Declaration of Britain, France and the 
United States which stated: 
1) The three govenunents recognise that the Arab states and Israel all 
need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purpose of 
assuring their internal secxirity and their legitimate self-defence 
and to permit them to play their part i n the defence of the area as a 
whole. A l l applications for arms or war material for these 
cotmtries w i l l be considered i n the light of these principles. I n this 
cormection the three goverrmients wish to recall and reaffirm the 
terms of the statements made by their representatives to the 
Security Council on August 4 1949, i n which they declared their 
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opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab 
states and Israel. 
2) The three governments declare that assurances have been 
received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms 
to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does 
not intend to tmdertake aggression against any other state. 
Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the 
area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future. 
3) The three governments take this opportimity of declaring their 
deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and 
maintenance of peace and stability in the area. The three 
governments, should they find that any of these states was 
preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would consistent 
with their obligations as a member of the UN, immediately take 
action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent 
such violation. 12 
Although this declaration was intended to reassure Israel that she 
was territorially secure, it did not solve the problems that she was 
experiencing in gaining arms. In the 1950s, American arms began 
arriving in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Whilst they might have been 
in response to the growing internal problems that these countries were 
facing, this did not allay Israeli concerns. Despite Israeli fears that the 
United States was favouring the Arab states at the time, continued 
American declarations pointed to the concern on the part of the United 
States not to be drawn into a significant arms supplying role within the 
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region. America did not, however, object to the supply of weapons from 
other states such as Britain and France (to whom Israel looked for 
alternative sources of supply). This position is shown by Dean Rusk: 
"We have ourselves tried not to become a principal 
supplier of arms in that region. But we are committed to 
the political independence and territorial integrity of the 
states in the Middle East." 13 
Therefore whilst providing necessary diplomatic support to the 
territorial integrity of the states in the area (which was still important to 
Israel given the refusal of the Arab states to recognise her right to exist), 
the United States hoped to refrain from becoming involved in the large 
scale provision of weapons to the Middle East. This is not to say though, 
that she was committed to the non-provision of weapons. Rather, she 
wished to detach herself from such a role, whilst being willing to supply 
a limited number of weapons if this became necessary. 
Several developments in the region rendered this position 
obsolete. The rise of Nasser in Egypt was one of the most fundamental 
concerns to the United States as it was feared that radicalism would 
spread throughout the Arab world. The establishment of the Ur\ited 
Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria also seemed to validate this 
position. In the international context of the post 1945 era, the emergence 
of Arab nationalism was seen to indicate a general reduction of Western 
influence in the Middle East. Coupled with this was the steady rise of 
Soviet influence in the area, for example through the provision of MIG-
21's and TU-16's to Egypt following the Suez campaign of 195,6. So>vie-t 
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military supplies to the Middle East, when coupled with the increase of 
radical Arab nationalism served to change Washington's perception of 
the role Israel could play in the region. 
Israel became more fully incorporated into the global strategy of 
the United States with the accession to power of Kennedy in 1961. The 
dominant theories behind thinking on the Middle East in the 1950s had 
assumed a more advantageous position for the United States through a 
balance between Arab and Israeli interests. Developments by the turn of 
the decade served to weaken the validity of these ideas. If the 1950s was 
the decade when American involvement regarding the supply of arms 
was kept to a minimum, the 1960's saw American commitment 
substantially increased. The first signs of this were in 1962 when the sale 
of the Hawk missile to Israel was announced and justified in the 
following terms: 
"we also keep the arms situation in the area under 
constant scrutiny and may supply purely defensive 
weapons with an overall picture of not becoming a major 
supplier of arms to either side. When in the course of 
recent review it was estabUshed that Israel needed an 
improved air defense capability the United States 
agreed to sell Israel the Hawk, a short range defensive 
missile." 14 
This sale came close on the heels of the disclosure of an extensive 
military shipment from the USSR to the principal Arab states (Egypt, Iraq 
and Syria) and in the same year Kennedy qualified the new relationship 
that was developing between the United States and Israel: 
24 
"The United States has a special relationship with Israel 
in the Middle East, really only comparable to that which 
• it has with Britain over a wide range of world 
affairs...We are in a position to make it clear to the Arabs 
that we will maintain our friendship with Israel and our 
security guarantees...I think it is quite clear that in the 
case of an invasion the United States would come to the 
support of Israel - we have the capacity and it is 
growing" 15 
The Israeli premier at the time, Levi Eshkol was anxious to extend 
American-IsraeU military ties for two reasons; doubts over the future 
supply of French arms (their main source of supply since 1956) and also 
the added sophistication of many of the American weapons available. In 
June 1964, he was the first Israeli PM to be officially invited to 
Washington, and just two years later, the rise in American military 
commitment was demonstrated with the sale of 48 Skyhawk planes and 
a further 52 soon after. Increasingly in this period, there was a 
dichotomy between the 'official' line and the actions that were taken. 
The official policy was still described in these terms: 
"established policy ...to refrain from becoming a major 
supplier of arms in this area while retaining the option of 
helping countries of the area to meet their defense 
requirements through occasional and selective sales" 16 
The policies of the 1950s had failed to bring stability to the area. By 
the outbreak of the 1967 war, America's role in the region had changed 
significantly. However, after the war, and Israel's performance during it. 
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the scale of US military aid was transformed. The following table 
provides clear quantative evidence of the radical shift in the US position: 
Tables 
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL 1948-1974 
Y E A R TOTAL LOANS GRANTS 
1948-61 0.9 0.9 _ 
1962 13.2 13.2 -
1967 7.0 7.0 -
1968 25.0 25.0 -
1969 85.0 85.0 -
1970 30.0 30.0 -
1971 545.0 545.0 -
1973 307.5 307.5 -
1974 2482.7 982.7 1500.0 
(Dollars in milUons) 
Source: M Rabie, (1988), p 66 
NOTES: 
1. C W Kegley Jr. & E R Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy. Pattern 
And Process, New York, St Martin's Press, 1991, Fourth Edition, 
p33 
2. J Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, New 
York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1980, Eighth Edition, p 20 
3. C W Kegley Jr. & E R Wittkopf, (1991), p 44 
4. J Spanier, (1980), p 26 
5. J Spanier, (1980), p25 
6. C W Kegley Jr. & E R Wittkopf, (1991), p 52 
7. G A Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, New 
York, F A Praeger, 1960, p 12 
8. HBrogan, The Pehcan History of the United States of America, 
London, Penguin Group, 1985, p 611 
9. M Rabie, The Politics of Foreign Aid. US Foreign Assistance and 
Aid to Israel, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1988, p 3 
10. B Reich, The United States and Israel. Influence in the Special 
Relationship, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984, pl50 
11. G Sheffer Ed. Dynamics of Dependence. US-Israeli Relations, 
Boulder, Westview Press, 1987, p 130 
12. G Sheffer Ed. (1987), p 88 
26 
13. B Reich, (1984), p 156 
14. B Reich, (1984), p 156 
15. G Sheffer Ed. (1987), p 98 
16. B Reich, (1984), p 157 
27 
PART TWO 
POLITICS AND 
P O L I C Y M A K I N G IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ISRAELI 
(American Jews)...are a political factor whose influence 
may vary but is always felt...American Jews have never 
hesitated, as American citizens, to bring their weight to 
bear in the cause of Israel, though it is hard to say how 
often, if ever, it has been decisive. Anything they do, 
they must do of their own free will. Israel cannot 
employ, command or incite them, though she can, and 
does keep them informed of her policies and needs. 
Walter Eytan "The First Ten 
Years" 
PART TWO 
POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED 
STATES & ISRAEL 
• Israel's Political System And Culture 
• The American Political System 
ISRAEL'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CULTURE 
To be able to examine the relations between America and Israel in 
the years 1967 - 1973, it is necessary to understand the composition of, 
and pressures upon Israeli society and the political elite. In many ways, 
which will be examined during this chapter, the Jewish state is unique 
and factors such as its geographic location and hostile Arab neighbours 
have served to shape the parameters of Israel's domestic and foreign 
policy. 
The political system in Palestine greatly influenced that of post 
independence Israel. Arab hostility to the idea of a Jewish national 
revival made it essential for the Jewish community of Palestine (Yishuv) 
to concentrate their efforts on the establishment of a Jewish homeland. 
To incorporate the differing shades of opiiuon, the Yishuv was viewed as 
a single community and elections to representative bodies in the period 
1920-1948 reflected this. After independence had been achieved, this 
method was adopted in the state of Israel, with the whole state becoming 
one electoral district. Votes are counted nationally and seats allocated in 
direct proportion to the ntm\ber of votes cast. 
Large numbers of parties compete for representation in the 
Knesset. For example, in the 1969 election, there were sixteen party lists 
with thirteen gaining representation. But, despite the number of parties 
and rapidly changing coalitions, there has been an tmderlying stability in 
the Israeli political system. The Labour party, with numerous coalitions 
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formed the Israeli government from 1948-1977. Although the IsraeU 
political system enables numerous parties to gain representation in the 
Knesset, there has been stability in the formation of government, and the 
percentage of votes that the three main blocs gain. The three main blocs 
in the political system, the religious parties, the socialists and the 
national-liberal parties held consistently high levels of support from the 
declaration of independence in 1948 until 1977. In the period 1948-1973 
the picture was as follows: 
Religious bloc received between 13 & 15% of the vote. 
Labour bloc received between 47 & 51% of the vote. 
National Liberals received between 23 & 27% of the vote.i 
This degree of stability has been surprising given the changing 
nature of Israeli society. Peretz describes immigration as the lifeblood of 
Zionism and a major objective in the establishment of the Jewish state.2 
In July 1950, the Law of Return was passed, described by David Ben 
Gurion in the following terms: 
'This law lays down not that the state accords the right 
of settlement to Jews abroad, but that this right is 
inherent in every Jew by virtue of his being a Jew if it but 
be his will to take part in settling the land. This right 
preceded the state of Israel, it is that which built the 
state."3 
This right to return has resulted in far reaching consequences. The 
institutions created before independence was achieved, accurately 
reflected the European values of the majority of Palestine Jewish 
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immigrants at the time. Yet, following the establishment of the state of 
Israel the continual influx of immigrants have been from differing 
cultural and economic backgrounds. The dominant Jews of the early pre-
state period were Ashkanazim, of Western origin, but in the late 1940s 
and 1950s, the vast majority of Jews were Sephardi, from Asia and Africa. 
There were a variety of reasons for this. As a result of the War of 
Independence in 1948, many Jews no longer felt safe in their Arab 
countries and therefore moved to Israel. In 1949-50 nearly all the Jews in 
Yemen were flown to Israel. At the same time, Iraq enacted a law to 
allow Jewish emigration (with the result that 121,000 Jews went to 
Israel*). Increasing political unrest in Arab countries at this time and 
economic insecurity also contributed to the influx. Israel however, being 
a modern and secular state was a very different country to the one that 
they had left behind. Several assumptions (that were true for the 
majority of Jews already in Israel) were inappropriate when applied to 
the Sephardim: 
• That they would be politically active, in a country where political 
activity was an importance feature. 
• That they were socialists (when the countries that they had come 
from were not). 
Peretz has concluded that Israel is really several societies in one covintry.5 
By the early 1970s this was becoming increasingly apparent. In spring 
1971, the Sephardi based Black Panther movement organised illegal 
street demonstrations reflecting their increasing frustration at poorer 
education standards, employment prospects and other social factors. By 
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this time, the Sephardim, with a higher birthrate than the Ashkenazim, 
represented over half the total Jewish popvilation.6 
Linked to this right of return, the most important aspect of Israeli 
political culture is ethnicity - the "Jewishness" of the state. This has 
arguably affected the policy decisions of Israel to a great extent. Shabtai 
Roseanne explained the influence it has had in these terms: 
"Israel is a Jewish state. The only Jewish state in the 
world, it was reestablished deliberately by the Jewish 
people as a Jewish solution to the Jewish problem which 
has scarred the history of mankind for over 2,000 years. 
This is the cardinal feature dominating all Israel's 
policy, domestic and foreign. This makes Israel unique. 
Without full appreciation of this elemental factor, it is 
impossible to understand Israel or any aspect of Israel's 
policy - domestic or foreign".7 
As the only Jewish state, Israel is seen as inextricably linked with Jews 
worldwide. Ben-Gurion described the ties thus: 
'This is Israel's primary and principal bond, prior to all 
other attachments and ties, vital to her life and soul, her 
character and future".8 
In addition to the 'Jewishness' of the state of Israel, a number of 
other factors have influenced the domestic and foreign policy decisions 
that have been taken. One of the most important strategic factors before 
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the Six Day War was Israel's geographic position as illustrated by Moshe 
Dayan: 
'Three quarters of the population of Israel lives in the 
coastal plain, running from north of Haifa to south of Tel-
Aviv, with a slender saHent branching off to Jerusalem. 
This densely settled area has an average width of no 
more than twelve miles between the Mediterranean and 
the Jordanian border. From the Israeli Parliament 
buildings in Jerusalem, the armed sentries of the 
Jordanian Arab Legion can be seen a few hundred yards 
away. The headquarters of the Israeli General Staff in 
the coastal plain are within clear view from the hills 
which mark the Jordanian frontier. 
...Scarcely anywhere in Israel can a man live or work 
beyond the easy range of enemy fire. Indeed, except the 
Negev, no settlement is at a distance of more than twenty 
miles from an Arab frontier. 
Thus, the term "frontier security" has little meaning in 
the context of Israel's geography. The entire country is a 
frontier and the whole rhythm of national life is 
affected by hostile activity from the territory of 
neighbouring states".9 
Security up until the 1967 war was Israel's primary concern. The legacy 
of the war that had been fought to create the state in 1948, and the 
continuing hostility of her Arab neighbours resulted in a significant 
percentage of Israel's GNP going towards defence expenditure 
(approximately 12% until the 1967 wario). In a state where security is so 
high on the political agenda, the boundaries between the military and 
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the state have occasionally become blurred. For example, in the period 
immediately before the 1967 war, the military played a significant role in 
the political decisions that were made. As Eban and Eshkol continued to 
favour a negotiated settlement to the build up of tensions in the area 
(discussed in greater detail in part three) the military leaders became 
increasingly insistent upon the need for war. They offered a number of 
reasons to substantiate their demand: 
• Egypt had altered the political and military balance in the region by 
her actions and orUy a war wovdd restore the status quo. 
• Egypt had knowingly carried out a series of provocations and 
failure to respond would undermine Israel's defence policy which 
was based on deterrence. 
• If the IDF did not initiate war, Egypt would and Israel would lose 
the strategic benefit of the first strike. 
• The Egyptian army was rapidly moving into position in the Sinai. 
• If Israel carried out a preemptive strike, it would enable her to 
make miUtary gains that could be used for bargaining after the 
war. 
• Israel should use the war to correct the distortions of the War Of 
Independence and conquer territories not captvired then eg. the 
West Bank.ii 
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By the 30 May 1967, with the signing of the U A R Jordan Defence 
Agreement (which placed Jordan's armed forces under Egyptian control) 
the coalition and opposition parties were practically united on the need 
for a National Unity Government. At this time, the military leadership 
was also hoping to see Moshe Dayan as the new Defence Minister (a post 
traditionally held by the Prime Minister) and his appointment on 1 June 
was illustrative of a move towards the military interpretation of events. 
Ben Gtirion, by this time a member of the Rafi party, supported Dayan's 
appointment as is illustrated by the following quote: 
"I have heard from three senior commanders that the 
inclusion of Dayan is a necessary condition to breathe Ufe 
into the army's flagging confidence in the political 
leadership...There are difficult moods in the army and 
who knows what will happen in the army. The army has 
to have confidence and it will have it when Moshe 
Dayan is Minister of Defence." 12 
After Dayan was appointed, these words were echoed by Brigadier 
General Haim Barlev: 
"we felt that we had a representative in the Cabinet." 13 
The outcome of the 1967 war had a significant impact upon Israeli 
society in a number of different ways. The rivalry between the 
Progressive and Revisionist strands of Zionism, which in the 1940s had 
cooperated in order to ensure the establishment of the Jewish state, was 
revived. In the initial years after the war, there emerged serious 
divisions over what should be the territorial boundaries of Israel. The 
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Labour Party position continued to see the issue in terms of security 
considerations, however, the religious and 'right wing' parties were 
influenced by ideological factors and this fostered the growth of the 
Greater Israel movement. Initially though, there was a consensus over 
the need for secure and defensible borders to be the prerequisite of a 
peace settlement. 
R J Isaac argues that the 1967 war was crucial in the impact it had 
on the stabiUty of Israel. 14 He suggests that prior to the war stability was 
achieved in part, through the perceived threat to the state, (itahcs added) 
With the outcome of the Six Day War, Israel was for the first time 
presented with a number of options. AU major parties saw the future of 
the occupied territories as a significant poUtical issue, and this produced 
disagreement as to the way it was to be tackled. Israel had a number of 
alternatives; whether to return the territories, which ones to return, 
which to retain in the interests of Israeli security and what conditions 
there should be for return of the territories. Isaac cites a number of 
factors which imdermined the consensus that had been Israel's strength 
before the war: 
• The prolonged stalemate which followed the 1967 war. 
• Continued rule over occupied people and territories. 
• Rising international criticism. 
• The sense that Israel had 'cards to play'.is 
In the period that followed the war, the Jewish people in Israel 
demonstrated considerable support for maintairung the territories, as is 
illustrated in the following table: 
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Table 4 
WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TERRITORIES 
TO OBTAIN PEACE 
% Not wi l l ing to return Occupied Territories 
100 
Golan Heights 
Gaza Strip 
West Bank 
Feb 68 Feb/Mar Mar/Apr Oct/Nov 
69 71 72 
Tewish Toumal of Sociology, vol 16, No 2, 1974, p 194 
Israel's occupation of the territories she had captured i n 1967 also 
brought economic consequences, as wel l as the political ones already 
highlighted. The 1967 war brought a large increase in military spending, 
to incorporate defence of the newly acquired territories. As already 
mentioned, defence spending prior to the war was approximately 12% of 
the GNP. This increased to 32% in the period up to 1973.16 
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Israel's involvement w i t h the two superpowers has had a crucial 
impact on its foreign policy decisions. I n 1947-48 i t was American and 
Soviet support at the Uni ted Nations which secured international 
legitimacy for the independence of Israel and her entry into the United 
Nations i n May 1949. The Basic Principles of the Israeli Government 
Programme announced i n March 1949 contained f ive principles 
regarding foreign policy. The first, was a policy oi ee-hizdahut, or non 
identification: 
"Loyalty to the principles of the UN Charter and 
friendship with all freedom loving states and in 
particular with the United States and the Soviet 
Union" 17 
The reference to both the United States and the USSR reflected, 
even at this early stage, Israel's dependence upon the two superpowers. 
But, the commitment to a policy of neutrality formvilated by Ben-Gtirion 
and Sharrett was to last less than two years. The early postures of non-
alignment i n Israel were soon replaced by an assessment that American 
support was crucial. A n interview w i t h a Foreign Ministry Official in 
Jerusalem i n 1968 showed the importance of the American role: 
"the stakes in relationship to America have been 
tremendous. She has the capacity to keep us afloat, to 
give us victory or to prevent defeat. It is crucial -
(governmental economic) aid, Jewish aid, military aid, if 
necessary"!* 
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A n Israeli academic. Dr. Benjamin Akz in saw the early 1950s as: 
"a conscious effort to become a US satellite, to win 
American friendship and support" 19 
A t this time, the Uruted States hoped to avoid identification wi th any of 
the protagonists i n the Middle East conflict. Al though 1951 saw the 
beginnings of American economic aid to Israel, her quest for American 
arms proved largely unsuccessful, and France became Israel's main 
supplier unt i l 1967. 
The outcome of the 1967 war obviously changed the geographic 
structtire of Israel fundamentally. The strategic problems Israel had 
experienced since the establishment of the Jewish state were significantly 
reduced i n just six days and, for the first time, Israel had achieved some 
degree of terri torial security. Yet, this d i d not translate into greater 
regional stability. The Arab states remained determined to recapture the 
territory that they had lost i n the war, and when the diplomatic process 
stalled, the October war of 1973 was the result. I n addition to this, the 
victory of the war brought about changed circumstances within Israel as 
the political parties became increasingly divided over the way forward 
w i t h regard to the occupied territories. A number of issues have 
dominated Israel's policymaking process since 1948, of which secimty has 
been just one. The "Jewishness" of the state has been crucial both i n the 
fact that Jews have the right to return to Israel (wi th implications for the 
character of Israeli society) and the fact that Israel is a focal point for Jews 
worldwide. This final point is of particular relevance to the next chapter, 
which w i l l focus on the American political system, and the strength of 
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the Jewish lobby wi th in it . 
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THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
I n order to understand the relationship between Israel and the 
Uni ted States i n the period 1967-1973, i t is necessary to have an 
appreciation of the American political process and the way i n which 
policy is created. The Jewish lobby is often seen as one of the most 
influential interest groups i n the political process and i t is the purpose of 
this chapter not ordy to explain some of the reasons for this, but also to 
examine the wider issues that result i n support for the state of Israel. 
The increasing complexity of government and the social structure, 
especially since the end of the second w o r l d war has resulted in a 
prol i ferat ion of interest groups addressing the issues that have now 
become the responsibility of government. The lengthy process of policy 
determination and the considerable number of institutions involved i n 
its formulat ion provide numerous opportunities for such groups to gain 
access to the political arena. 
The arrival of Jewish immigrants to the Uruted States early i n the 
1900s saw the establishment of a number of community organisations 
such as the American Jewish Committee. They were formed to defend 
Jews against anti-semitism and to promote their commtmity interests at 
all levels. The creation of the state of Israel i n 1948 extended the role of 
Jewish organisations to incorporate support and help for the Jewish state. 
There is l i t t le doubt that community organisations have become an 
effective focus of support for Israel. This is arguably one of the reasons 
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that the Jewish lobby has been so successful i n influencing the political 
process, and is demonstrated i n the following quote: 
"...the hallmark of American Jewry is its diversity. 
Being a Jew does not automatically endow one with a set 
of values and ideas shared by all others who are called 
Jews...The commvmity can only be united in so far as it has 
areas of mutual concern to all its members; within 
American Jewry, there is one primary concern, namely 
Israel..."! 
Link ing to this, Truman states that a key factor i n the success of an 
interest group is the uiuty of the group itself: 
'The problem of cohesion is a crucial one for the poHtical 
interest group. Other factors bear upon its capacity to 
assert its claims successfully upon other groups and 
institutions in the society, but the degree of unity in the 
group is probably the most fundamental in determining 
the measure of success it will enjoy."2 
Efforts wh ich were tradit ionally appHed to the maintenance of a 
positive image for American Jews were, after 1948, largely directed 
towards the adoption of a beneficial foreign policy towards Israel. The 
original role of the commimity organisation has to a large extent been 
surpassed by the protection of the interests of the state of Israel. The 
coordination that exists between the national and grassroots levels of 
the Jewish community provides a key to their sustained influence 
w i t h i n the policy process. Senator James Buckley described the 
Jewish community as: 
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"extremely effective in doing what the Constitution 
encourages; that is peaceful assembly and the right to 
petition. I only wish others were as good at it as the lews 
are"3 
The American Israeli Public Affa i rs Committee (AIPAC) is the 
successor of the American Zionist Council and whilst a prominent 
position i n Washington may be the most visible sign of its success, this 
has been bui l t on the fotmdations of American Jews operating through 
more than 200 national groups.4 The staff of the AIPAC is only small in 
comparison to other Jewish organisations (approximately 60) but i t is able 
to take advantage of a national network of voluntary committed 
activists. 
Established i n 1959, the AIPAC is the only group officially registered to 
lobby on behalf of legislation affecting Israel. The focus of the AIPAC is 
on Congress, and i t has been described by Paul Findley as: 
"the preeminent power in Washington lobbying" 5 
There are a number of factors that affect the ir\fluence the AIPAC is 
able to exert on Congress: 
1. Voter Turnout 
Jews represent approximately 4% of the American population as a 
whole, but for a number of reasons the electoral weight of their vote is 
greater than that. Overall, the average turnout i n a presidential election 
is 50-55%, but the Jewish vote is regularly 85%. This is significantly 
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higher than the national average and therefore increases the effect that 
the Jewish vote can have on the outcome of an election. The same is 
also true i n primaries, where the national voting figure can be reduced to 
a 35% average. 
Coupled w i t h this is the location of the majority of the Jewish 
population i n eight significant electoral states. (New York, California, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut and 
Florida.) I n a close election therefore, the high turnout of Jewish voters 
can be decisive i n a key state. 
A f i n a l poin t i n relat ion to voter turnout. I f congressmen 
considered that Jewish constituents d id not see their stance on Israel as 
sigiuficant, the electoral consideration wovild disappear. A CBS Election 
Survey in 1976 fo \md that 44% of Jewish voters i n the state of New York 
considered support for Israel as one of the three key issues they looked 
for when determining the way that they would vote.6 I n the words of 
Charles Liebman: 
"support for Israel becomes not only support for a state...or 
for its inhabitants - rather support for Israel is the symbol 
of one's Jewish identity."7 
2. Involvement i n Politics 
The greater Jewish turnout i n elections is also reflected i n their 
general involvement i n politics. This is demonstrated by the following 
quote by Spiegel: 
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"Jewish strength in America arises from the thousands of 
individual Jews who are prepared to express their 
sentiments to politicians and officials."^ 
M i l t o n H immel fa rb explains the Jewish interest i n politics i n the 
fol lowing way: 
'The zeal of untraditional Jews for politics is their de 
facto religion. With all they've gone through, those Jews 
are still messianic and their religion is politics."^ 
Historically, the Jewish people have supported the Democratic party and 
Hurley estimates that Jews represent between 10 and 20% of people 
actively involved i n Democratic politics.io In general terms, Jews seem 
to be more involved i n politics than the average American. This interest 
is demonstrated i n a number of ways, one of which is financial. Jews 
give generously i n poli t ical campaigns. On the issue of donations, 
Trtmian suggests the fol lowing: 
"Except when a donation is purely a matter of personal 
friendship, the central objective of contribution is access 
to the power of the elected official".! 1 
Lee O'Brien suggests that: 
"This high level of voter participation goes hand in 
hand with financial donations to candidates...American 
Jews are estimated to donate more than half the large 
gifts to national Democratic campaigns and an increasing 
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amotmt to Republicans as well." 12 
Jews are also generous when giving their time to support a candidates 
election campaign. Through both day to day involvement i n politics and 
contributions made dt i r ing the time of an election campaign, Jews are 
likely to be influential i n the political system. 
3. Supply of Information and Scrutiny of Congressmen 
The extent to w h i c h the A I P A C provides in fo rma t ion is 
demonstrated by Senator Charles Mathias' comments i n 1981: 
"When an issue of importance to Israel comes before 
Congress, AIPAC promptly and imfailingly provides all 
members with data and documentation...Beyond that, 
signs of hesitation or opposition on the part of a Senator 
or Representative can usually be relied upon to call forth 
large mmibers of letters and telegrams or visits and phone 
calls from influential constituents" 13 
Senator Mathias' comments not only demonstrate the widespread nature 
of the AIPAC's role i n supplying information, but also the close scrutiny 
of members of Congress by A I P A C staffers and suppor t ive 
representatives. Special attention is given to proposed legislation of 
relevance to Israel. Close monitoring is made possible by the attendance 
of at least one AIPAC representative at every open committee meeting, 
w i t h closed meetings attended by someone f r o m the pro-Israel caucus. In 
addition to this, the weekly newsletter produced by the AIPAC the "Near 
East Report" is distributed free to all Congressmen, key government 
officials and other people prominent i n foreign policy. 
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Another way in which support is gained f rom Congress is through 
tours of Israel, therefore widening congressional "knowledge" regarding 
Israel. Up to 50% of members of Congress have travelled on such all 
expenses paid visits to Israeli4 
4. Relationship W i t h Key Individuals 
One highly successful method that the AIPAC has employed has 
been the association w i t h key individuals w i t h i n the policy making 
process, for example legislative aides. Both Morris Amitay and Thomas 
Dine (former leaders of the AIPAC) had themselves been aides. In 
cultivating these types of associations, the AIPAC is able to open another 
avenue for access to the political system through which information may 
be channelled. 
5. Lack Of A n Effective Opposition 
The Arab lobby faces a number of challenges when attempting to 
influence the American political system. Support for Israel is already a 
wel l established part of the American poUtical process, generated by well 
orgarused and coordinated Jewish organisations. The Arab lobby does 
not have this k ind of operational base. I n addition, popular American 
perceptions and understanding of Arab culture and Islam are in no way 
comparable to the knowledge of the state of Israel. Israel is able to 
capitalise effectively on the similarities that exist between the United 
States and Israel. Cxirtiss offers this interpretation of the Jewish lobby: 
"Whatever resentment many congressmen may inwardly 
entertain about the pressures of the lobby, the American 
system itself predestines them to yield. Israel possesses a 
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powerftd American constituency, the Arabs do not, and 
despite their wealth, the oil companies as well, (they) 
are unequal to the impact of ethnic pohtics" 15 
To summarise, the Jewish lobby is able to affect the American 
political process for a number of reasons: 
• The high turnout rate of Jews in elections. 
• The level of interest of Jews in politics i n America. 
• The information that is given to congressmen and the scrutiny of 
their position over Israel. 
• Relations w i t h key congressional figures. 
• The lack of an organised opposition to the Jewish lobby. 
The Chairman of the AIPAC I L Kenan recognised the importance of 
Congress i n gaiiung support for Israel: 
"...AIPAC has worked through Congress to win economic 
and military aid for Israel, administrative diffidence in 
meeting Israel's requests was always based in the fear 
that the US initiatives in support of Israel would be 
counterproductive. The State Department had one eye on 
the Persian Gulf, one eye on Moscow - and Israel was out of 
sight. It was Congress - not the Administration which 
moved to vote supporting assistance to Israel in 1971 and 
for aid to Soviet Jewry in 1972. Over the years, Israel 
had to go deeply into debt to pay for its weapons and it 
was not until October 1973 that the Administration 
proposed massive grant military aid, commensurate with 
Israel's urgent need."16 
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Many Congressmen attempt to explain their allegiance to Israel in 
terms of the character of the Israeli state. They see i t as a friendly nation, 
similar i n many ways to the United States. i7 Israel is viewed as the only 
pro-Western democracy i n the Middle East, and this contrasts greatly 
w i t h the lack of understanding of Arab culture and way of l ife. This 
perception of Israel was particularly important during the period 1967-
1973 given the context of the Cold War. Israel was seen as the only 
country i n the Middle East that could maintain American interests in 
the region and control Soviet expansionism in the area. Central to this 
was the idea that American and Israeli interests coincided. The 
Chairman of the American Jewish Committee described the relationship 
i n these terms: 
"We bend over backwards to help people understand that 
help for Israel is also in America's strategic interest." 18 
There has also been a ' t r ad i t iona l ' association w i t h , and 
commitment to, Israel. This is often put forward as justification for the 
continuation of support. President Ford expressed this notion in 1974: 
'The United States...has been proud of its association 
with the State of Israel. We shall continue to stand with 
Israel. We are committed to Israel's survival and 
security." 19 
A m i d 1975 Washington Post pol l confirmed this position when 87% of 
the House of Representatives said that the United States had a moral 
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obUgation to prevent the destruction of Israel.20 
This commitment appears to be mirrored i n American public 
opinion which reflects strong support for Israel as is shown by the 
fo l lowing table; 
Tables 
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One of the most effective ways to demonstrate the support that 
exists w i t h i n congress for Israel, is to examine the allocation of foreign 
aid. Whilst the executive prepares the country's foreign aid programmes 
(in consultation w i t h the US Agency For International Development, the 
Office Of Management A n d Budget, and other interested government 
agencies). Congress actually has the powers of appropriation. The 
fo l lowing diagram illustrates the passage of an Israeli foreign aid b i l l 
through Congress: 
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INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS BEGIN FOR ISRAEL: 
I n the House of 
Representatives Sub-
committee of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee on Europe 
and the Middle East 
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committee of Foreign 
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the Near East and Southern 
Asian Affairs 
I I 
Recommendations then 
considered i n f u l l by the 
Committee on Foreign 
Affai rs 
Proposals discussed in 
the Foreign Relations 
Committee 
Reported out to: 
. Senate 
Representatives 
It is interesting to note that since 1970, the Israeli Minister of Finance 
submits a report t i t led "Requirements For US A i d " which reviews 
economic trends and requirements of the military and civilian sectors. 
This contrasts to the usual procedure when an A I D mission would visit 
the country to prepare the initial programme. 
Traditionally, foreign aid has not been popular i n Congress, but 
aid to Israel has proved to be the exception to this rule. I n the period 
1969-76, Congress d id not reduce the administrations' requests for aid to 
Israel. Rather, Congress increased them by an average of 8.7% at a time 
when overall requests were being reduced by as much as 23.5% .21 In the 
same period, an average of 80% of votes cast i n the Senate and 86% of 
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votes cast i n the House were in favour of Israel.22 
To conclude, the natvire of the American political system gives a 
number of opportunities to interest groups wishing to influence the 
decision making process. The Jewish lobby has been particularly effective 
i n this. The creation of the State of Israel i n 1948 extended the role of 
Jewish organisations to include support for the Jewish state. And as w i l l 
be demonstrated i n the fo l lowing chapters of this study, the way i n 
which support for Israel was sought, changed over time. Initial requests 
for aid were based on himiarutarian grounds. The war of 1967 changed 
this and aid for Israel became more closely linked to American foreign 
policy objectives as is demonstrated i n the following quote: 
"It was not long ago when most Americans tended to dte 
primarily moral and emotional reasons for their support 
for Israel...but...the case for stressing the strategic side of 
the story has intensified in recent years. Israeli officials 
themselves have encouraged this trend, fearing that the 
massive simis of US miUtary and economic assistance to 
Israel might cease to be acceptable to the American public 
and Congress uidess explained in such a hard nosed way. 
If Israel were shown to provide a useful military and 
strategic service to the United States on the other hand, 
the aid becomes justified on the basis of self-interest as 
well as national morality."23 
I t is the purpose of the remaiiung text i n this thesis to examine in 
detail the events that took place between the years 1967-1973 and the 
shape of American-Israeli relations i n this period. 
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PART THREE 
A M E R I C A N - ISRAELI 
R E L A T I O N S 1967-73 
The conflict between us (Israel) and the Arabs 
is insoluable. The war is not about this h i l l or 
that river, but over the very existence of a 
Jewish state i n the Middle East. 
Moshe Dayan 
PART THREE 
AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS 1967-1973 
Introduction 
The 1967 War 
Nixon in Command - The First Years 1969-1970 
Diplomacy and Stalemate 
The Results of Frustration 
INTRODUCTION 
Having examined the background and context of American-Israeli 
relations, and looked at the political systems of the two countries, i t is the 
purpose of this part of the study to trace the developments of relations 
dur ing the period 1967-73. Several themes throughout this period 
served to influence the direction of America's Middle East policy: 
• The changing nature of relations between the superpowers 
• The continued perception of the Soviet threat 
• The fear of radicalism i n the Arab wor ld 
The Six Day War and Israel's performance i n i t proved crucial to the role 
that America believed Israel could play i n the area. 
The War of June 1967 proved to be instrumental i n changing the 
perceptions of the principal protagonists i n the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
also the major powers outside the region. The pre-emptive strike 
launched by Israel on the 6 June began a comprehensive defeat of the 
Arab states, and i n just six days Israel increased her size threefold, 
incorporating large portions of Arab land into her territory (as illustrated 
i n f ig . 2 overleaf). The changes that occurred can be briefly stimmed up 
as follows: 
• Soviet influence wi th in the Arab states increased w i t h military 
advisers sent to Egypt and Syria i n great numbers to help 
reconstruct the defeated armies (despite the fact that Soviet 
armaments had failed to avoid a convincing Israeli victory). 
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Fig 2 ISRAELI CONQUESTS 1967 
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Publishing Co. 1986, p314 
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• Israel's confidence both i n her own strength and in her ability to 
survive increased. 
• The idea that Israel could act as a "strategic asset" became a f i rmly 
established tenet of American foreign policy. 
Ironically, relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab States, 
who backed them, were strengthened after the defeat inflicted by Israel. 
On a practical level, the Soviet Un ion embarked upon a massive 
programme of military and economic support for the Arab states, quickly 
replacing the amoimt of military hardware that had been lost i n the war. 
The Soviet newspaper "Izvestia" suggested that the Arab states realised 
that only: 
"through reliance upon the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries, can they abolish completely 
imperialist influence in the Middle East and achieve 
Israeh withdrawal from the Occupied Territories"! 
A principal concern of the Israeli government before the war had 
been the survival of the state itself. What Michael Brecher terms "The 
Holocaust Syndrome"2 was a relevant component of Israeli decision-
making i n the prewar period, as described by this quote f rom the then 
Chief of Staff, Yitzak Rabin: 
"We have no alternative but to answer to the challenge 
forced upon us, because the problem is not freedom of 
navigation, the challenge is the existence of Israel and 
this is a war for that very existence"3 
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Following Israel's dramatic victory, ini t ial government speeches 
demonstrated more confidence and a determination to hold on to some 
of the newly acquired territories. This can be illustrated in a nimiber of 
ways, fo r example through the in i t ia l policies of the ru l ing Labour 
govenmient. The war radically transformed the territorial and strategic 
position of Israel, making her considerably more secvire. The early view 
of the Labovir Party i n response to this was that there should be: 
• No retvim to the 1967 borders 
• N o redivision of Jerusalem 
• A "security" border along the Jordan river 
These views were quickly implemented. The Knesset soon 
legislated for the reunification of Jerusalem, which i n effect annexed the 
Arab section of the city. I n September, only a few months after the end of 
the war, the construction of Jewish settlements i n the Occupied 
Territories began. I t has been suggested that by December 1969, the Israeli 
government of Golda Meir had established as one of its most important 
tenets: 
"the acceleration of military settlements and permanent 
agricultural and urban settlements in the territory of the 
homeland" .4 
I n the context of superpower relations, the Israeli victory i n the Six 
Day War was crucial to the position that America believed Israel cotdd 
occupy in the Middle East. I n such a strategically important area as the 
Midd le East (given its proximity to the USSR) the United States saw 
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Israel as a potential 'strategic ally' i n the aftermath of the Jime War, and a 
buffer against the tide of Soviet expansionism i n the region. America's 
Middle East policy as a consequence of this, was designed to maintain the 
status quo (and the position of Israel) un t i l a peace settlement cotild be 
achieved. The next chapter w i l l focus i n more detail on the reasons for 
the 1967 war and the practical results of i t , whilst subsequent chapters 
w i l l examine the way i n which American-Israeli relations developed in 
the years that followed 1967. 
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THE 1967 WAR 
In the period which led to the 1967 war, the borders between Israel 
and her Arab neighbours saw a f lur ry of activity which culminated i n the 
shooting down of a number of Syrian aircraft. This had been precipitated 
by Israeli attempts to ctiltivate the land in the demilitarised zones on the 
Israeli-Syrian border. Russian involvement i n the area, although slight 
d u r i n g the early part of the 1960s, witnessed something of a 
transformation towards the end of the decade. Soviet-Egyptian relations 
especially, i n the years preceding 1967, had flourished. Glassman 
identifies two themes i n Arab-Soviet relations in the pre 1967 period: 
• The USSR hoped to further the unity of the Arab states by making 
a confrontation w i t h Israel a realistic military possibility. 
• The Soviet role w i th in the individual Arab states, and the politics 
of the Middle East i n general (especially as regards the provision of 
weapons) increased significantly.i 
These themes coincided w i t h radical change in the region which 
pointed to a more socialist orientation, for example, the monarchies of 
both Iraq and Yemen fel l between the Suez and the Six Day War crises. 
A t this stage, the Arab states had already developed a close relationship 
w i t h the USSR and considerable Russian aid was invested i n the region 
throughout the 1960s. 
62 
The relationship between Israel and the United States remained i l l 
defined. Concern about their potential isolation and the legacy of the 
Suez crisis when America compelled their wi thdrawal f r o m Sinai, the 
Gaza Strip and Sharm-el-Sheikh, prompted the Israeli government to try 
to clarify the position of the United States. Initial crisis decisions were 
taken by the f ive party coalition government elected to office on 12 
January 1966. The two key Cabinet ministers were Levi Eshkol as both 
Prime Minister and Defence Minister and Abba Eban as Foreign Minister. 
Eban was a particularly strong believer in gaining American support to 
avoid isolation and i n the immediate prewar period, he put forward a 
number of reasons for an intensive political effort to achieve this goal. 
He believed that American support was vi ta l for ensuring arms aid 
when the war came, and also for retaining the fruits of victory at the end 
of the conflict. He also thought i t would help to mobilise international 
opposition to Nasser. The Minister of the Interior, Moshe Shapira was 
another supporter of this course of action, stating: 
"If the war came...it was essential that Lyndon Johnson 
should not be against us...lf we had not waited we would 
still have conquered in the field of battle; but we would 
have lost in the political arena. The United States woxild 
not have stood by our side in the way which she did."2 
Both the United States and France emphasised the risks involved 
i f Israel was to attack first. O n 24 May in the United Nations Security 
Coxmdl (UNSC) session, de Gaulle warned Eban that: 
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"Israel must not make war unless she is attacked by 
others. It would be catastrophic if Israel were to shoot 
first."3 
Those words were echoed just days later by Johnson, again to Abba Eban: 
'The central point Mr. Minister is that your nation not be 
the one to bear the responsibility for any outbreak of 
war" .4 
A subtle distinction can be made between these two quotes however, in 
that de Gaulle concentrates on the importance of Israel not launching the 
f i rs t strike whereas Johnson emphasises the Israel should not bear 
responsibility for an outbreak of war. Following Israel's preemptive 
strike, the French placed an embargo on future shipments of arms to 
Israel. There appears however, to be a crucial discrepancy between the 
official line adopted by the Johnson administration in the days leading to 
the outbreak of war and their reaction to Israel's preemptive strike when 
it occurred. 
Both Eshkol and Eban were relatively "dovish" members of the 
Israeli political establishment, anxious to explore aU possible avenues for 
a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. I n the latter part of May, the 
inevitability of war became an accepted tenet of the Israeli military and 
intelligence establishments, w i t h the Chief of Mi l i t a ry Intelligence, 
Ahron Yariv, pressing for a war that he thought was both unavoidable 
and w i t h i n Israeli's grasp.s David Hirst suggests that a war i n the late 
1960s was i n a sense "needed" .6 Israel was experiencing its most severe 
economic depression and immigra t ion , the tradi t ional yardstick of 
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Zionist success was almost equalled by emigration. A war therefore 
wou ld serve to distract attention away f rom Israel's internal problems. 
Eshkol continued to stress the importance of gaining f u l l American 
backing before entering into war. The trend seemed to move towards the 
mil i tary interpretation of events, w i t h Moshe Dayan's appointment to 
the Ministry of Defence (a post traditionally held by the PM) on 1 June 
confi rming this. 
Coinciding w i t h Abba Eban's tr ip to Washington at the end of May 
was a visit by the head of Mossad, Meir Ami t , who held a number of 
meetings w i t h senior pol i t ical figures i n Washington. Informat ion 
regarding the details of such discussions is understandably scarce, but it 
appears relatively certain that A m i t met w i t h the Director of the CIA, 
Richard Helms and the Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara. He 
returned to Israel a few days later believing that the United States d id not 
oppose a preemptive strike by Israel. (This, it is suggested by Andrew and 
Leslie Cockburn, convinced Lev i Eshkol that he had obtained the 
necessary support f r o m America, making the f irs t strike f r o m Israel a 
reahstic possibility7). The idea that America's public rhetoric urging 
caution was not echoed privately is strengthened by Johnson's failure to 
lay the blame of the Six Day War at Israel's door. 
I n the countdown to war, Nasser's closure of the Gulf of Aqaba 
and the Straits of Tiran proved to be an ill-advised step in the already 
tense atmosphere surrounding the increased activity around Israel's 
borders. Eshkol's description of this development as a 'gross violation of 
international law...an act of aggression against Israel' was supported by 
President Johnson. Since 1957, the United States had been committed to 
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the freedom of navigation i n the Straits (the price of Israeli withdrawal 
i n 1956). 
I n the days before the war broke out, western press and public 
opinion displayed significant support for Israel's situation. The "David 
versus Goliath" image fostered sympathy for a people who only 25 years 
ago had faced genocide. David Hirst offers a different perspective which 
demonstrates the confidence of the Israeli military machine: 
"there were those, the generals, who knew that the real 
situation was the exact reverse of the apparent one, that 
David was not merely a match for Goliath, but 
hopelessly outclassed him. They knew that, whatever 
the politicians might say or the people beheve, Israel's 
survival was never at stake, that even if Nasser actually 
intended to go to war, he had no chance of winning" 8 
The part played by the Israeli intelligence community i n the Six 
Day War was crucial. Meir A m i t had taken over as head of Mossad in 
1963 and his appraisal of Mossad's most important task; the collection of 
mili tary and political data on the Arab states, was to prove invaluable to 
Israel's victory. For example, the first two and a half hours of the war 
v i r tua l ly guaranteed its outcome because of the almost complete 
destruction of the Egyptian airforce as i t was on the ground being 
serviced. (This occurred fo r only 10-15 minutes but the Israeli 
intelligence service had managed to ascertain when and for how long 
this would take place).9 
I n the post 1967 period, the victory that had been w o n came to 
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dominate much of the Israeli policy making process. In his first policy 
statement fo l lowing the end of the war, the IsraeU premier, Levi Eshkol 
was keen to emphasise that there wou ld be no wi thdrawal f r o m the 
Occupied Territories as there had been in 1957: 
"Do not deceive yourself that the State of Israel is ready 
to retxirn to the pUght it experienced a week ago. Israel 
was founded by right, yet it has been forced to struggle 
and struggle again to defend this right. We alone fought 
for our survival and security and we are to determine 
what are our genxiine and vital national interests and how 
to secure our own future".10 
I n the svimmer of 1967, two policies were adopted which set the tone of 
the IsraeU governmental response to the war. The first, adopted on 17 
June gave authorisation for the application of the "Law Jvirisdiction and 
Administration of the State of Israel to any area of Eretz Israel designated 
by government order". This settlement policy affected principally five 
areas; the West Bank, Jordan Valley, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip and the 
Golan Heights. Secondly, a policy was adopted by the Knesset stating that 
the present situation regarding the Occupied Territories would continue 
tmt i l direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbours resulted 
i n a peace treaty.! i 
The Ben-Gurionist "bargaining f rom strength" approach therefore 
achieved a great amount of credibil i ty and affected the terms of a 
settlement that Israel was likely to accept. The desire to maintain the 
territories for strategic and nationalistic reasons was also supplemented 
by ideological and religious factors. In Dayan's words: 
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"One factor should be taken into account in any debate on 
the future of the occupied areas - the yearning of the 
people of Israel to return to their land - without this 
yearning and its fulfilment there would never have been a 
state of Israel, nor a return to Zion, which is more 
important than the state" 12 
Prime Minister Eshkol also referred to such a bond i n the immediate 
aftermath of the war: 
"The roots of the Israeli people are in this land, as deep 
as ancient days. Throughout the generations the people 
of Israel maintained their spiritual and material bonds 
v^th this land, which were never cut off even when they 
were driven into exile. Simultaneously, the land has been 
faithful to us and did not give herself to an alien nation. 
She remained waiting for the return of her sons and for 
the ingathering of her exiles. Today the whole world 
has become aware of the fact that there is no power 
capable of uprooting us from this land". 13 
A f t e r acting as Chief of Staff dur ing the conflict, Yitzak Rabin 
expressed an interest i n becoming the Israeli ambassador to the US and 
his appointment was confirmed i n October 1967. Rabin was a f i r m 
believer i n the necessity of increasing links between the Uruted States 
and Israel, something he saw as vital to maintain the power of the Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF). Following the war, the difference i n the American 
attitude between 1956 and 1967 was immediately evident. There were no 
immediate demands fo r the wi thdrawa l of Israeli troops f r o m the 
Occupied Territories. This was to be indicative of a wider change in the 
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American perception of the situation i n the area. A State Department 
study, directed by the former ambassador, Julius C Holmes, concluded by 
stressing the connection between the conflict and the expansion of the 
Soviet presence i n the region. 14 W i t h this i n mind, the achievement of 
peace i n the Middle East became seen as an essential prerequisite for the 
reduction of Soviet influence i n the area. 
n 
A special emergency session of the U N General Assembly was 
called i n m i d June to discuss the latest conflict. The differences existing 
between the parties were quickly exposed. There were three crucial areas 
to be resolved; the nature, t iming and extent of the Israeli withdrawal 
f r o m the Occupied Territories. Fundamental issues separated the 
positions of the Arab and Israeli delegates. The Arab States demanded an 
immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal, but Israel continued to 
stress that wi thdrawal could only be dealt w i t h alongside direct peace 
negotiations towards a f ina l peace settlement. The memoirs of both 
Rabin and Eban provide useful information on the subject of the postwar 
negotiations and the problems that beset them. Rabin is scathing of the 
Arab commitment to peace, illustrating this w i t h the adoption by the 
Arab States at the Khartoum Conference, i n September 1967, of the 
famous three no's stance: 
• No peace. 
• N o recognition of Israel. 
• No negotiations w i t h Israel. 
69 
Eban suggests i n his autobiography,is that the Israeli moderates who 
wanted peace were hemmed i n by the poUtical r ight w i n g which 
strengthened after the war. The war fostered the growth of the Eretz 
(Greater) Israel movement, which advocated the retention of all the 
territories. Consequently, the forces for peace on both sides faced an 
uphi l l battle in the immediate postwar period. 
The fa i lu re of discussions i n the General Assembly (GA) 
precipitated the referral of the issue to the Security Council which on 22 
November 1967 adopted Resolution 242 (for the text see Appendix C) an 
ambiguous document intended to paper over the cracks of seemingly 
irreconcilable differences. The aims of Resolution 242 can be 
summarised as foUows: 
• The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces f rom the Occupied 
Territories 
• A n end to the state of war between the countries i n the region 
• The achievement of a settlement of the refugee problem 
m 
I n the year that fo l lowed the war, the Johnson administration, 
whilst pursuing peace through the U N attempted to l imi t arms to Israel 
and hoped also to gain the cooperation of the USSR. From the Soviet 
perspective the issue of arms control was clearly linked to the peace 
process itself, as illustrated by this quote f rom Tass: 
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"measxtres for a slackening of the arms race in the Middle 
East of course, could only be considered in condition 
of...full evacuation of Israeli forces:. 
(Tass: English, Jxily 1968) 
There is some evidence to suggest that the USSR did wish to l imit 
its mil i tary involvement i n the Middle East. For example, they resisted 
Egyptian attempts to sign a formal pledge for a role i n Egypt's defence, yet 
they continued to supply a considerable number of arms to the Arab 
States. 
I n January 1968, the American embargo on new arms shipments 
to the region was l i f t e d and that same month saw Levi Eshkol i n 
Washington to discuss Israeli arms requests. In the postwar period, the 
role of the United States developed significantly un t i l the USA became 
Israel's pr imary source of supply of sophisticated weaponry. David 
Pollock suggests three main reasons for this development; American 
determination to preserve Israel's military superiority, Soviet resistance 
to regional arms control pending the rearmament of Egypt and Syria and 
final ly, the French refusal to resume the role of major arms supplier to 
Israel.i6 July 1968 saw the first development i n this direction, w i t h the 
announcement of the first new sale of arms. The failure of talks between 
France and Israel led to the outgoing Johnson administration agreeing to 
the sale of over 50 advanced F-4 Phantom jets as a replacement for the 
French Mirage planes i n December 1968. 
Whils t i t was only after 1967 that the substantive changes i n 
American policy really became evident, they were i n fact, a continuation 
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of the policies Johnson had supported i n the prewar period. For 
example, the scale of military assistance that was offered to Israel. In the 
financial year 1964, virtually no assistance was of a military nature, yet in 
just two years, this negligible amount had increased to 71% of all 
assistance offered to Israel i 7 Whilst i n the period that immediately 
fol lowed the war. arms supplies to Israel were limited, i n the medium to 
long term, America became Israel's principal source of arms and military 
assistance. These developments, dur ing Nixon's presidency, are the 
focus of the next chapter. 
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NIXON IN COMMAND - THE FIRST YEARS 1969-70 
H a v i n g travel led extensively i n the 1960s, and serving as 
Eisenhower's Vice-President between 1953-1961, N ixon came to the 
White House already possessing much political experience and a good 
knowledge of foreign affairs. His choice of National Security Adviser, 
Henry Kissinger also had a specialist knowledge of foreign policy, but was 
not an obvious choice, given his support for Nixon's Republican rival . 
Nelson Rockefeller i n the 1968 election. To complete the major 
appointments i n foreign affairs, Wi l l i am Rogers was appointed as 
Secretary of State. 
Kissinger noted i n his autobiography, the problems faced by any 
incoming administration, i n having to deal w i t h the problems they have 
crit icised the previous adminis t ra t ion fo r not tackling, i W h e n 
describing the decade fol lowing the Suez crisis, Dan Tscirgo makes all too 
evident the dangers of a protracted conflict: 
"Despite the facade of a relatively stable impasse 
between the Arab States and Israel, the issue merged 
with global and regional political currents to form the 
volatile mixture that eventually culminated in war" .2 
I n l ight of this, the 1967 war encouraged the administration not 
only to consider the need for a solution to the problems of the Middle 
East but to assume a prominent role i n the search for a solution. The 
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decision to adopt a more active diplomatic role was taken by the Nixon 
administration i n response to two factors: 
• The lack of progress towards peace in the Middle East 
• Nixon had campaigned on the issue of new initiatives being taken 
Just a few days after he had become president, Nixon pointed to 
the new direction of the American administration: 
"What 1 want to do is to see to it that we have strategic 
arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if 
possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the 
same time - for example, on the problem of the Mideast 
and on other outstanding problems in which the United 
States and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve 
the cause of peace...I beUeve we need new initiatives and 
leadership on the part of the United States in order to 
cool off the situation in the Mideast. 1 consider it a 
powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused."3 
This quote demonstrates that N ixon placed great emphasis on 
Soviet-American relations and the global context. This was applied to 
Nixon's (and Kissinger's) vision of the Middle East. Importance was 
attached to the potential for superpower conflict rather than the integral 
parts of the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. For a broad range of foreign policy 
questions regarding Israel, the responsibility for policy making was split. 
Global aspects were the responsibiUty of the National Security Council 
and the White House (a team headed by Kissinger). Regional policy was 
to be handled by the Department of State, w i t h coordination achieved at 
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assistant secretary of state level. The National Security Council (NSC) 
met on 1 February to review Middle Eastern policy. Three options were 
considered: 
• To leave the search for a settlement to the parties involved in the 
conflict and Dr Jarring. 
• To pursue an increasingly active American role - involving USA 
and USSR talks. 
• To assimie that no settlement was possible and concentrate on 
objectives that wotdd fal l short of a settlement.4 
The second opt ion was seen as the opt imum position, but the thi rd 
alternative was to be considered i f no progress could be made towards a 
settlement. 
A t the begiiming of Nixon's term of office, the United States had a 
nimiber of opportunities to take up the more active role that it wished to 
pursue. Before Nixon's inauguration, the Soviets had suggested a peace 
plan to implement Resolution 242 (which was to fail) and on 16 January, 
the French proposed four power consultations regarding the Middle East 
(a suggestion that had been made before and rejected xmder the Johnson 
administration). The Uni ted States accepted both four power and 
bilateral talks, reflecting the new outlook of the Nixon administration. 
This was despite misgivings over the pressure that America may be 
tmder to 'deliver' Israel at the negotiating table (as no one else had the 
influence to do so). The fears of the Washington administration 
regarding the coiirse of the negotiating process were succinctly put by 
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Kissinger i n a memorandum to the President: 
"Everyone points out that we will be expected to deUver 
Israel in any negotiation. The Arabs assume - wrongly, 
but irrevocably - that we can make Israel do as we wish. 
The French and British assume we coiild do more than we 
have. Perhaps only the Soviets - who know the limits of 
their own influence in Cairo and Damascus - realistically 
understand the limits of our influence in Jerusalem, but 
they find too much propaganda advantage in our support 
for Israel to admit the truth publicly."5 
The reactions of Israel and her supporters to such discussions were 
not favourable. A delegation of Congressmen expressed their concern to 
Nixon and Kissinger that events were not moving towards an imposed 
settlement. A t this stage, the relationship between the USA and Israel 
was not as close as that of the Arab States and the Soviet Union. For 
example, i n the discussion that took place between Assistant Secretary of 
State, Joseph Sisco and the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrinin, the 
involvement of the Arab states was considerable but the Israelis were 
only briefed after such meetings had taken place.6 Regular contact was 
maintained between Sisco and Rabin. A t one informal meeting Sisco 
outlined the American position: 
"Our interests in the Middle East do not centre on Israel 
alone. Oxu" moral and practical commitment to Israel is by 
no means everything that Israel wants or does. Let me 
tell you frankly; if her friendship with Israel is the only 
thing the United States is left with in the Middle East, 
that would be a catastrophic setback for American 
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policy. We must work for a political solution because it is 
the only thing that wil l safeguard our own array of 
interests in the region." 7 
The State Department was keen to press for new initiatives in the 
search for peace and believed that a compromise solution could be 
reached tmder the auspices of U N envoy, Dr Gunnar Jarring. In a paper 
released by the State Department, general principles out l ining the 
objectives America hoped to achieve in the discussions taking place were 
laid down as: 
• A binding peace agreement (although not necessarily a peace 
treaty). 
• Territorial adjustments that crucially, did not reflect the weight of 
the Israeli conquest i n the war of 1967. 
Implicit here, is the idea that such objectives could only be achieved with 
the cooperation of Israel and, on the latter point i n particular, most 
probably through the influence that the United States could exert on her. 
The begirmings of the N i x o n administrat ion posed potential 
problems for Israel. The election i n 1968 had seen unprecedented activity 
by the rapidly expanding Jewish Lobby, but Nixon had entered the White 
House without the majority of their vote. A n d the initial policies of his 
administration suggested changes f r o m the Johnson era. For example, 
America's commitment to a more active role i n the peace process wi th in 
the region alarmed Israel, especially when i t involved other major 
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powers such as the USSR and France whose positions were opposed to 
her own. Israel preferred negotiations to be conducted between the 
parties d i rec t ly i nvo lved , v i e w i n g any outside in tervent ion as 
unnecessary, as is shown in the quote below: 
"Israel entirely opposes the plan to convene the 
representatives of states that lie outside the Middle East 
in order to prepare recommendations concerning the 
region. Israel is not and wi l l not accept any 
recommendations which are in conflict with her vital 
interests".8 
Such concerns were reiterated by Eban, in a visit to Washington i n 
the middle of March. When shown the general principles paper he 
rejected i t outright and asked that i t not be submitted. Eban suggested 
that Egypt was not ready to sign a peace treaty acceptable to Israel, and 
seemed to be content, for the time being, w i t h the status quo.9 
American arms policy towards Israel developed significantly under 
Nixon. Both Nixon and Kissinger believed military assistance could be 
used to extract concessions f r o m Israel which might lead to peace in the 
Middle East, as is illustrated by the fol lowing quotation f rom Kissinger's 
memoirs: 
'The President reacted to this seeming softening of the Soviet 
attitude by modifying his original decision on Israeli 
military aid. Realising that we could not approach Israel 
with the cease-fire proposal while rejecting its military 
requests, Nixon the same day approved my suggestion to 
replace IsraeU aircraft losses with up to eight Phantoms and 
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twenty Skyhawks in 1970." 10 
M i l i t a r y assistance under N i x o n increased significantly, but debate 
continues as to whether i t actually encouraged Israel towards, the 
compromise necessary for peace. This is illustrated i n the words of Fred 
Khour i i n 1983; 
'The United States created such a strong military force in 
Israel that there was little incentive to make those major 
concessions considered in Washington to be necessary for 
peace with the Arabs. In addition the more Israel was 
armed by the United States, the more dependent the Arab 
States became on Soviet military and economic aid. In 
short, Israel's superior military power and its resulting 
imwUhngness to make the concessions needed for peace, 
made Israel more of a liability than an asset in 
preventing the spread of Soviet power and influence in 
the Middle East ."l l 
n 
Golda Meir took over as Israeli premier, fol lowing Eshkol's death 
i n 1969, and she faced a d i f f i c u l t posi t ion bo th internally and 
internationally. A t this time, the National Uni ty Government (the 
central decision-making body in the 1967 war), was still i n place. This 
included the anti-Socialist bloc known as Gahal (led by Menachin Begin) 
w h i c h i nc luded the ' h a w k i s h ' He ru t par ty , therefore making 
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compromise over the territories di f f icul t . Differences i n both ideology 
and approach i n the National Unity Government were evident at this 
time. Internationally, the deadlock remained between the parties i n the 
Middle East and this was soon reflected i n the positions of the USA and 
the USSR. There was little progress towards peace as i t became obvious 
that the two superpowers could not agree on the essential elements of 
peace. This d id not deter the efforts of the State Department. To some 
extent, the breakdown of the ceasefire prompted this, w i t h Nasser's 
launch of the War of At t r i t ion i n March 1969, (which lasted tmti l August 
1970) designed to change the military and territorial status quo that had 
resulted f r o m the Six Day War. A t the beginning of 1969, Nasser 
outlined Egypf s aims i n this: 
"...The first priority, the absolute priority in this battle 
is the military front, for we must realise that the enemy 
wil l not withdraw unless we force him to withdraw 
through fighting. Indeed, there can be no hope of any 
pohtical solution unless the enemy realises that we are 
capable of forcing him to withdraw through fighting" 12 
On December 9 1969, Secretary of State, Rogers, outlined what 
became known as the Rogers Plan: 
"We believe that while recognised political boundaries 
must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any 
changes in the preexisting lines should not reflect the 
weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial 
alterations required for mutual security. We do not 
support expansionism. We believe that troops must be 
withdrawn as the resolution provides. We support 
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Israel's security and the security of Arab states as 
well" .13 
The proposed accord between Egypt and Israel called for: 
• The states to agree on a timetable for withdrawal f rom the 
Occupied Territories. 
• To end the state of war and refrain f rom acts of aggression. 
• The future of the Gaza Strip to be negotiated between Israel, Jordan 
and Egypt and Jordan under the auspices of Dr Jarring. 
• Egypt to allow Israel the use of the Suez Canal. 
• Each state to recognise the sovereignty of the others and their 
poUtical independence and right to live i n peace wi th in secure 
boundaries. 
Despite the hopes of the State Department, the reactions to the Rogers 
Plan were, for the most part, negative. Israel was the first to denounce 
the proposal, Golda Meir stating that: 
"Israel won't accept this...nobody in the world can make 
us accept it. It would be treasonous for any Israeli 
government to accept it" 14 
This was fol lowed by an IsraeU cabinet statement; 
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"Israel will not be sacrificed by any power or interpower 
policy and will reject any attempts to impose a forced 
situation on her... 
The proposal by the USA cannot but be interpreted by the 
Arab parties as an attempt to appease them at the 
expense of Israel" 15 
Russia and Egypt also rejected the plan. By proposing such an accord, 
America had damaged her relationship w i t h Israel. I n the period 
fo l lowing the 1967 war, Israel was aware of her stronger position on the 
Midd le East vis-a-vis the Arab states and was not therefore eager to 
compromise. The unity of the coaUtion government reflected this. The 
Rogers plan had been an American initiative, reflecting the direction 
that the NSC had wanted American Middle East policy to move in and, 
fo l l owing its failure, American-Israeli relations began to enter a new 
phase. As Soviet involvement i n the area increased, American relations 
w i t h Israel began to deepen and the provision of aid, specifically military 
aid, increased. 
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DIPLOMACY AND STALEMATE 
The United States reacted w i t h alarm to the stationing of Soviet 
troops i n Egypt fol lowing Nasser's visit to Moscow in January 1970. The 
gravity of the situation was expressed by Joseph Sisco: 
"The United States regards with the utmost seriousness 
the installation of Soviet missiles in Egypt and the fact 
that Soviet planes are flying operational missions...If the 
Soviet Union wants to test the readiness of the United 
States to intervene in the Middle East she would be 
making a grave error if she thought the Vietnam 
experience had undermined the capabilities of our country 
to defend her interests in the Middle Easf' . l 
American perceptions of Soviet aims were particularly critical i n 
this period, as shown by Nixon's comments to Will iam Rogers: 
"The difference between our goal and the Soviet goal in 
the Middle East is very simple, but fundamental. We 
want peace. They want the Middle East."2 
I t was at this stage that American policy towards the region 
reached something of a crossroads. The State Department (supported by 
the Department of Defense) continued to oppose increasing the supply 
of arms to Israel, and blamed her for the deepening of the War of 
A t t r i t i o n . A t this time though, Kissinger began to argue for a new 
course. He remained primarily concerned w i t h the presence of the USSR 
i n the region. As this increased, the Israeli rationale that only a strong 
84 
Israel could deal w i t h Russian influence i n Egypt, became more diff icidt 
to resist. American poUcy in the early 1970s therefore had two strands; 
the supply of additional arms to Israel and the pursuit of a cease-fire in 
the region. 
Following the failure of the Rogers Plan, the NSC met to discuss 
Middle East policy. On 26 Jvme, Kissinger issued the following statement: 
"we are trying to get a settlement in such a way that the 
moderate regimes are strengthened and not the radical 
regimes. We are trying to expel the Soviet military 
presence, not so much the advisers, but the combat pilots 
and the combat personnel before they become so firmly 
entrenched"3 
Consequently, a less ambitious scheme was announced which became 
known as Rogers 'B ' . The framework of talks that had taken place earlier 
i n Nixon's Presidency (two and four power) was maintained, but the 
Rogers Initiative was essentially an American proposal. The principal 
details of the plan were as follows: 
• A 90 day cease-fire w i t h negotiations taking place under the 
auspices of Dr. Gunnar Jarring. 
• U N Resolution 242 to be the basis for progress towards a 
settlement. 
• Egypt and Jordan were to accept the principle of peace and 
recognise Israel's right to exist. 
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• Israel to accept the principal of withdrawal f rom the Occupied 
Territories.4 
(see Apperidix D for further details). 
A t this time, American-Israeli relations were strained i n a nixmber 
of ways. Immediate Israeli rejection of the second American initiative 
was criticised i n the United States. Rabin, the Israeli ambassador, notes i n 
his memoirs that the link was made between Israel's reaction to the 
proposal and the outcome of current Israeli requests for Phantom 
aircraft.5 Israeli foreign relations were consequently dominated by 
tension w i t h the United States and also the War of At t r i t ion w i t h her 
neighbours. I t is w o r t h noting here that the prospects for agreement 
between the superpowers were possibly greater than at other times. The 
development of detente between the superpowers made the United 
States more anxious to persuade Israel to accept the initiative, especially 
given the increase i n Soviet involvement i n the region. A t the same 
time, Nixon was also concerned to reach agreement to reaffirm domestic 
fears that the administration was not abandoning its 'commitments' to 
the Jewish state.6 Consequently, on 23 Jiily Nixon sent a message to 
Meir indicating that the administration wou ld not pressure Israel to 
accept the Arab interpretation of Resolution 242 or support a settlement 
that would jeopardise the security of the IsraeU state.7 
Following Nasser's acceptance of the initiative on 22 July, the 
Israeli cabinet at the end of July voted to accept the American proposal. 
This decision was significant fo r a number of reasons. As regards 
domestic politics, the decision caused the break-up of the coalition. After 
the end of the 1967 war, there had been broad agreement amongst 
leading Israeli political figures. Yet, by 1970, there were deep divisions 
w i t h i n the coalition. Acceptance of the proposal meant the practical 
wi thdrawal f r o m the commitments made i n the period immediately 
fo l lowing the war. Essentially two principles were rescinded i n the 
acceptance of the Rogers' Initiative; the demand for direct negotiations 
(replaced w i t h the idea of mediation), and the possibility of partial 
wi thdrawal f r o m all fronts was considered. I t was for these reasons that 
Gahal refused to accept the Rogers' Initiative and they withdrew f rom 
the government i n August 1970. 
As a result of the Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of the Rogers' 
Initiative, the cease-fire came into operation on 8 August. Israel soon 
claimed to have found evidence of Egyptian violations of the agreement, 
w i t h continued troop movements. This only served to foster the idea 
that the Egyptians were using the cease-fire as a way to re-group for the 
War of At t r i t ion . Following this, and America's refusal to supply Israel 
w i t h additional arms, Israel annovinced on 6 September that i t wotdd not 
be participating i n the Jarring mission unt i l the cease-fire was correctly 
implemented. Events on the same day in Jordan transpired to alter 
American perceptions of the Middle East and its strategy there. 
On 6 September, the PFLP (the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine) hijacked three international planes, w i t h nearly 500 hostages, 
many of whom were American, and f lew 2 of them to Jordan (the third 
landed i n Cairo and was b lown up minutes after the hostages had been 
rescued). The t w i n objectives of the PFLP were to secvire the release of 
Fedayeen prisoners held i n Israel and to provoke a confrontation 
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between K i n g Hussein and the Fedayeen. N i x o n hoped for the 
confinement of the conflict w i t h i n Jordan, but on 20 September Syria 
invaded Jordan. The f u l l consequences of this are only imderstood when 
looking at the bi-polarisation of the region which had occurred especially 
since the war of 1967. The United States principal ally against the spread 
of Soviet influence was Israel, but King Hussein led another pro-western 
power i n the region. I t was therefore inconceivable to allow a Soviet 
backed regime to invade. Jordan requested assistance f r o m the United 
States, which was given by increasing Israel's military strength. Bolstered 
by this, on 22 September King Hussein sent his air force to attack the 
Syrian tanks which quickly retreated towards Syria. American interests 
i n the region were preserved when the Syrians backed down. King 
Hussein had remained i n power and Israel had successfully promoted 
American interests. I n a speech in November 1970, Israel was used as an 
example of the Nixon doctrine i n operation:^ 
"the change that the Nixon doctrine calls for from 
bearing the primary responsibility ourselves to enabhng 
our f r i e n d s to shoulder it m u c h more 
themselves...Nowhere is our support more necessary or 
more closely linked with our efforts to achieve peaceful 
solutions, than in the Middle East" .9 
As a consequence of the events i n Jordan, the Fedayeen was weakened 
and a few days after the crisis, an agreement was signed i n Cairo between 
Hussein, Arafa t and other Arab leaders to prevent fur ther clashes 
between the PLO and King Hussein i n Jordan. 
This favourable outcome to the problems in Jordan came at a 
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part icularly useful time fo r the N i x o n administration. Faced w i t h 
November congressional elections, their foreign policy had been 
struggling prior to the Jordan crisis; w i t h the Vietnam war continuing to 
take American lives and little progress towards peace i n the Middle East. 
The results i n Jordan were also used (partly) as validation for a 
new approach to reducing Soviet influence i n the Midd le East. 
Following the Jordan crisis, effective control of Middle East policy passed 
f r o m the State Department to Nixon and Kissinger (ironically, at a time 
when N i x o n w o u l d soon become preoccupied w i t h domestic political 
scandals). The White House, after 1970, became increasingly reluctant to 
maintain the ]ink between political concessions and mili tary assistance 
to Israel, a l though the State Department preferred to retain this 
approach. Mi l i ta ry aid to Israel was justified as a means of promoting 
peace i n the fol lowing ways: 
• Compensating Israel for the strategic disadvantages suffered as a 
resvilt of Soviet rearmament of Egypt. 
• Inducing the Israeli government to return to the Jarring talks. 
When i t was realised that the Egyptian missiles violating the cease-fire 
w o u l d not be wi thdrawn, (American intelligence had verified Egyptian 
violations on 14 August) the alternative course pvirsued by the United 
States was that of matching the Soviet commitment to Egypt w i t h more 
mili tary assistance to Israel. For the next three years, relations between 
the two coxmtries floiirished w i t h unprecedented levels of aid. 
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The region now seemed relatively calm fol lowing the Jordan crisis 
and Soviet influence i n the region declined. I n this period, as American-
Israeli relations evolved, the key to stability i n the area was defined i n 
terms of a mili tary balance, rather than new peace initiatives. 
The death of Nasser i n late 1970 had led to a more open policy 
being pursued by Egypt. The 'socialism' implemented by Nasser was not 
fo l lowed by Sadat i n his 'Open Economic Policy' and the United States 
was consequently encouraged to adopt a new policy towards Sadat. 
Principally, this involved demonstrating that a Soviet military presence 
i n Egypt was a hindrance to Sadat rather than a help. I t was argued that 
Egypt w o u l d not recover the Sinai mil i tar i ly as any military assistance 
provided by the USSR would be matched by aid to Israel f r o m the United 
States. Therefore, the recovery of the captvired territory was more likely 
i f the involvement of the Soviets was curtailed and i n 1972 Sadat 
expelled the Soviet military advisers. 
From 1971, i t appeared that the immediate danger i n the Middle 
East had passed. The continuing cease-fire along the Suez Canal, the 
death of Nasser and the consolidation of BCing Hussein's authority i n 
Jordan all pointed to greater stability i n the area. It was not only the lack 
of imminent danger that precipitated the diplomatic standstill i n the 
Middle East after 1970. Again, the Washington administration became 
preoccupied w i t h other areas of the wor ld ; the lingering problem of 
Vietnam, China and the SALT treaty all drew attention away f rom the 
Middle East. 
W i l l i a m Quandt also claims that electoral considerations 
90 
influenced the desire to maintain a low profile i n the Middle East.^o He 
suggests that the chances for a negotiated settlement were negligible 
(especially given Egyptian cease-fire violations) and thus there was little 
electoral gain to be made f r o m actively pursuing a treaty i n a Presidential 
election year. "Firm American diplomatic and military support of Israel, 
rather than active pursuit of an Arab-Israeli settlement" was the line 
adopted by the Washington administration i n 1971.11 Towards the end 
of the year, a new arms deal w i t h Israel was aimoimced, incorporating 
the sale of 42 Phantom aircraft and 90 Skyhawks over the next two years, 
w i t h $300 milHon i n credits each year to help finance the purchase. The 
type of commitment made by the United States appeared to change in 
this year. Talks held i n Washington w i t h Golda Meir were aimed at the 
long range modernisation of Israeli military power. A t this time, Israeli 
spokesmen expressed their hopes that military and political issues i n US-
Israeli relations w o u l d no longer be subject to the same Linkage as had 
been the case i n the recent past. 
Dur ing this period, both American and Soviet miUtary deliveries 
to the Midd le East continued at a h igh level. But, i n 1972, Soviet 
weapons supplies to Egypt were reduced, which precipitated (to some 
extent), the expulsion of Soviet miUtary advisers f r o m the covmtry later 
i n that year. Early i n 1972, Sadat was convinced that the detente between 
the superpowers was already affecting arms supplies to the region. For 
example, he retxirned empty handed f rom Moscow in February 1972: 
"It was clear that the stalemate - no peace, no war suited 
the superpowers. There was some agreement between 
them about the level of arms supplies".!2 
91 
speaking to the Central Committee of Egypt's Arab SociaUst Union, Sadat 
pointed clearly to the need for Egyptian freedom of movement, as the 
reason behind the expulsion of the Soviet advisers. 
Shlomo Slonim suggests that, to Sadat, the Soviet presence was very 
much a 'two-edged sword' as although they were of assistance to Egypt's 
defence capability, Sadat's room for manoeuvre for a permanent end to 
the conflict ( through mil i tary or diplomatic means), was restricted.13 
The War of A t t r i t i on had obviously failed to dislodge the Israelis, and 
consequently Arab f rus t ra t ion increased. I n the words of Shlomo 
Slon im: 
'The removal of the Russians was a conditional precedent 
to Egypt's freedom of action in the projected confrontation 
with Israel".14 
One f u r t h e r major development i n this per iod , was the 
pol i t ic isat ion of o i l , wh ich u n t i l now, appeared to have remained 
outside the parameters of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I n the post 1967 
period, optimism remained high that they w o u l d remain separate and 
nimierous factors encouraged this belief. For example, the collapse of the 
Arab o i l embargo declared after the 1967 war. David PoUock sets out 
three developments which, by 1973, were cause for concern: 
• I n the United States, the domestic supply proved tmable to keep 
up w i t h the pace of demand, which resulted i n a greater 
dependency upon oil imports (especially f rom the Middle East) 
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• A n increase i n the imcertainty about the availabihty and price of 
imported oil , caused by a number of nationalisations of oil 
companies 
• PoUtical isolation that American poUcy had so far experienced was 
threatened eg. Qaddhafi announced the nationalisation of USA oil 
companies.15 
Progress towards peace in this period was slow. The development 
of detente between the superpowers and the increased stability i n the 
region fo l lowing the Jordan crisis, resvdted i n American foreign policy 
making being directed elsewhere. I n addition to this, the preoccupation 
w i t h Vietnam and the emerging scandal of Watergate deflected attention 
away f r o m the Middle East. However, relations between the USA and 
Israel d i d develop i n this period. The first Rogers Plan i n 1968 created a 
r i f t i n relations, but i n the f i r s t f ew years of the 1970s, a closer 
relationship developed. Peace through military parity was the theme at 
the beginning of the 1970s, w i t h Soviet mili tary aid to the Arabs being 
matched by American aid given to Israel. I n the victory she had won in 
1967, Israel had proven to be a strategic asset i n the region, and Nixon 
clearly saw Israel as a demonstration of the Nixon Doctrine i n action. 
Whilst the United States viewed Israel as her principal ally i n the 
region and armed her accordingly, she failed to take into account the 
increasing frustration felt i n the Arab States at this time. The Arab States 
had been deeply affected by the outcome of the Six Day War and were 
arixious to move towards regaining some of the territory they had lost i n 
1967. I n part, the inertia of American policy dur ing this time was 
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responsible for the stalemate i n the peace making process. Nixon and 
Kissinger relied on the provision of arms to Israel to retain the status quo 
and failed to anticipate that the Arab States would be prepared to enter 
another war so soon after the losses that were inflicted upon them in 
1967. The consequences of this are discussed in the next chapter. 
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THE RESULTS OF FRUSTRATION 
I 
The war of 1973 shattered two basic assvmiptions that had been 
made by the American administration i n the early part of the 1970s: 
• That the military balance i n the Middle East was the key to 
political stability eg. if IsraeU military superiority was maintained, 
the Arabs wou ld not attack. 
• War seemed to make sense for the Arabs only if there was no 
possibility of recovering the territory by political or diplomatic 
means.1 
The extent to which these ideas were entrenched goes at least 
some way to explaining the reasons for the Egyptian and Syrian attack on 
Israel being such an international sxirprise. There had been a high level 
of Arab secrecy, but both the CIA and Mossad had previously concluded 
that the possibilities fo r war were marginal. I n his memoirs, N ixon 
points to the fact that the CIA had misinterpreted a nvmiber of events. 
For example, massive t roop movements were seen as annual 
manoeuvres and the large increase i n Syrian military activity had been 
seen as a precaution against Israel's recent shooting down of three Syrian 
jets.2 
Crucial to the outcome of the 1967 war was the part played by the 
intelligence commxmity and the information they gathered prior to the 
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outbreak of hostilities. The story of 1973 was of an intelUgence service 
that failed to perform its primary ftmction; the advance warning of the 
onset of war. 
The pr imary reasons for the failure of the Israeli intelligence 
service to detect the impending attack were threefold. The problem of 
the displaced Palestinians had remained imtackled since 1948 and the 
1950s and 60s saw Palestinian nationalism flourishing. The Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) was foimded in 1964, and this marked a 
turn ing point i n the 'armed struggle' that many of the Palestinians 
beUeved themselves to be engaged in . Coupled w i t h this, there was the 
outcome of the 1967 war, which resulted i n Israel occupying the areas 
where the m a j o r i t y of Palestinian terrorists had been based. 
Consequently, i n the years that fol lowed, the incidents of Palestinian 
terrorism increased significantly. I n the interwar years therefore, IsraeU 
intelligence became increasingly focussed upon combating this internal 
problem (especially after the Munich Olympics and the ki l l ing of eleven 
Israeli athletes). A number of agents i n this period were wi thdrawn 
f r o m other areas (principally Egypt and Syria) to enable a greater 
concentration on this problem. lUustrating the scale of the problem, 
between 1968 and 1970 alone, 115 planes were hijacked by the PFLP.3 
The seeds of the second reason were ironicaUy sown in the victory 
of 1967. Primary responsibUity for the faUure to detect the oncoming war 
must lie w i t h the mUitary inteUigence part of the service (Amman), the 
largest and most important body of the intelUgence service.* The new 
head of Amman i n 1972 was General EU Zeira (following the departure 
of General A h r o n Yar iv ) , w h o believed that Egypt lacked the 
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organisational and mi l i ta ry capability to attack Israel. Despite the 
informat ion gathered by various intelligence agencies relating to the 
troop movements i n both Egypt and Syria, it was concluded that war was 
unlikely. Moshe Dayan (the Defence Minister) predicted i n August 1973 
that there wou ld be no war for several years. 5 This vdtimate confidence 
i n the status quo was derived to a large extent f rom La-Konseptzia or the 
'concept'. The origins of the 'concept' can be traced back to the mihtary 
victory of 1967 and the scale of American military aid which followed the 
victory. The 'concept' had three main strands to i t - the Arabs were not 
ready/prepared for an all out war w i t h Israel; i f there was a war it would 
be a short one; i f there was a war, the Arabs would be defeated quickly 
and Israel wou ld be left w i t h the option of advancing to both Cairo and 
Damascus.6 
Clearly the extent to which the 'concepf had become an accepted 
part of the mili tary establishment goes at least some way to explaining 
the failure of the intelligence community to accurately interpret the 
informat ion i t had gathered. I f most mili tary persormel subscribed to 
this idea, Stewart Steven suggests that information contradicting the 
'concepf was qtiite possibly ignored. 7 Other contrary indicators were also 
present, for example Sadaf s rhetoric: 
"We shall spare no efforts or sacrifices to fulfil our 
objective. I shall not discuss any details, but the 
liberation of the land is the first and main task facing 
us."8 
Finally, Mossad did predict a war, but i n May 1973. I t is possible 
that the unnecessary alert i n May deterred a miUtary build-up just a few 
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months later; but Chaim Landau, a leading member of the IsraeU 
oppos i t i on talks scathingly of the f inanc ia l considerations of 
mobilisation: 
'The May mobilisation cost us I£40 miUion and the Arabs 
did not attack. The war cost us I£50 million an hour, not 
to mention the lives lost. How much of a saving was 
that?"9 
Sadat's motives fo r war were misunderstood. American and 
Israeli analyses of the si tuat ion i n the immediate prewar period 
dismissed the potential for armed confUct because of the lack of Arab 
miUtary capacity to regain the Occupied Territories. I n the war of 1973, 
this was not Sadaf s primary goal. Rather, he hoped that a further war 
woxild break the stalemate that had developed in the peace process; the 
conflict was interpreted as necessary to rejuvenate the diplomatic 
process. 
"After six years, our men on the Suez Canal and our 
students wanted action. Ideas started to crystallise in my 
mind as early as 1972" 10 
There were three basic differences to the wars that had preceded 
the one of 1973; there was no intention of destroying Israel, the claims of 
the Palestinians were not amongst the main considerations and the 
main conflict w i t h Israel was, by now, its continued occupation of the 
Arab lands captured i n the 1967 war. 
The intelligence community 's assurance that the government 
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w o u l d always be given at least 48 hovirs notice before a war, faUed. A 
meeting between Dayan, Gali l i and Meir on 3 October concluded that 
Israel was stUl i n no immediate danger of attack (this conclusion was also 
reached a day later by Eban and Kissinger i n Washington). The 
evacuation of Russian advisers i n Syria on 5 October (a paraUel of what 
happened in Jvme 1967) d id arouse the suspicions of the IsraeU premier, 
however, as she notes i n her memoirs, she failed to take decisive action, 
preferr ing instead to rely upon the assurances of the Department of 
Defence and the intelUgence service, n The Arabs struck on the hoUest 
day i n the Jewish calendar, when many regular servicemen were 
spending the day w i t h their families, and much of the IsraeU army was 
made up of reservists. This placed the Israeli army at a severe 
psychological disadvantage, and they were also outnumbered i n men 
and weaponry. Golda Meir states that the war proved a nimiber of basic 
Israeli assumptions had been incorrect: 
• The low probabiUty of an attack i n October 
• The certainty that there would be svifficient warning before an 
attack took place 
• The belief that Israel wou ld be able to prevent the Egyptians f rom 
crossing the Suez Canal (the Egyptians achieved this on the first 
day of the fighting and Sadat became known as the 'hero of the 
crossing'.)! 2 
The init ial poUcy of the United States was dependent upon a swift 
Israeli v ic tory . Their concerns at the beginning of the war were 
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threefold; assure the security of Israel, maintain relations w i t h the 
moderate Arab states eg.. Jordan and Saudi Arabia and avoid a 
confrontation w i t h the USSR whilst preserving the current detente. 
These objectives necessarily dictated a low profile i n the conflict 
itself. This w o u l d also result i n the United States being i n a strong 
position i n the post war period to influence the diplomatic process that 
wou ld be taking place. Nixon made a clear reference to both his beUef i n 
a quick Israeli victory and also the need for a settlement, i n a statement 
two days after the commencement of the war: 
"We must not under any circumstances allow them (Israel) 
because of the victory they are going to win - and they'll 
win it, thank God, they should - but we must not get away 
with just having this thing hang over for another foiir 
years and have us at odds with the Arab world. We're 
not going to do it anymore".!3 
As stated above, this postwar position reUed upon a decisive 
IsraeU victory. But, by the 12 October, this possibUity had disappeared, 
and was now replaced by an urgent IsraeU request for American arms. 
Kissmger noted that, throughout the early days of the war, i t appeared 
that Israeli hopes for a victory had been overoptimistic culminating 
i n the demand for arms on 10 October.i* A t this stage in the confUct, 
America's f irst aim (the security of Israel) was proving to be more 
d i f f i cu l t to achieve than had first been thought. I n addition to this, 
relations w i t h Saudi Arabia were worserting. Relations had been 
de ter iora t ing th roughout 1973 fo r several reasons inc lud ing 
principally, America's persistent failure to influence Israel to accept 
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and implement Resolution 242. King Faisal had already indicated at 
the beginning of 1973 that he was prepared to use o i l as an 
instrument of foreign poUcy and after the outbreak of the October 
War that is exactly what happened. A conference was held to decide 
how the o i l producing Arab States covild help i n the 'Arab war of 
Uberation'. I t was agreed that oi l production would be reduced by 5% 
each month: 
"until such time as total evacuation of Israeli forces from 
all Arab territory occupied during the June 1967 war is 
completed and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people are restored".15 
As far as domestic American politics were concerned, the 
outbreak of the October war could not have come at a worse time, in 
that the Watergate revelations were affecting not only the domestic 
poUtical scene, but also the abilities of the administration to operate 
effectively i n other areas. Throughout the duration of the conflict, 
N i x o n remained completely preoccupied by the domestic scandals 
which were hotmding his administration, investing i n Kissinger an 
unprecedented degree of authority i n the foreign poUcy realm. The 
problems that N i x o n faced at home are we l l i l lustrated by the 
resignation of his Vice-President Spiro Agnew on charges of 
corrupt ion and tax evasion on 10 October, (the four th day of the 
conflict). These internal matters also had ramifications in the foreign 
policy process, i n that i t became increasingly d i f f i cu l t to expect 
Congressional approval for any commitments made. I n m i d 1974, 
Chalmer Roberts, a colimmist for the Washington Post wrote: 
101 
"Foreign policy is made both by convmission and omission. 
It is affected by mood and nuance, by judgments of 
strengths and weaknesses, by one govemmenf s measure of 
another's wi l l as well as its ability to act, by one 
national leader's perception of a rival or friendly 
leaders' political standing in his own country and its 
effect on both national power and policies". 16 
(italics added) 
Dur ing the war, the American and IsraeH positions began to 
diverge. Whilst the United States hoped for an early cease-fire, Israel 
wanted to ensxire a mil i tary victory. N ixon saw the impracticality of 
attempting to encourage the protagorusts, at an early stage in the war, to 
accept a cease-fire, but hoped that they would accept one when neither 
side had a decisive mi l i ta ry advantage. Early American hopes of 
maintaining a relatively balanced approach to the war faded i n light of 
Israeli requests for military assistance, and a subsequent Soviet airl if t to 
the Arab states. On 13 October Sadat refused a proposed cease-fire and 
N i x o n authorised an a i r l i f t of mil i tary equipment to Israel. The next 
week was crucial i n that i t brought both the implementation of the cease-
fire and the reversal of Arab fortxmes. It was 16 October when the Israeli 
forces re-crossed the Suez Canal and this prompted Egyptian hopes for an 
end to the confUct soon after. The impartiaUty of the United States was 
imdermined further, just three days later, when Nixon requested $2.2 
b i l l ion i n aid for Israel. On 20 October, i n response to this. King Faisal 
announced an embargo of oil to the United States: 
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"in view of the increase of American military aid to 
Israel the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to halt 
all oil exports to the United States for taking such a 
position".! 7 
A t this time, the superpowers coordinated their efforts to achieve 
a cease-fire i n the region. Kissinger left for Moscow on 20 October and 
therefore was unaware of the domestic developments i n the United 
States. The Special Prosecutor, Cox, was f i r e d , f o l l o w e d by the 
resignations of other senior officials i n what became known as the 
'Saturday Night Massacre.' In l ight of these domestic problems, Kissinger 
was given complete authority on his peace-seeking mission to the USSR 
but, much to his displeasure, the Soviets were informed of this, therefore 
robbing h i m of the usual delaying tactic of ' r e fe r r ing back to 
Washington'.18 This ttirned out to be unnecessary because agreement 
upon a cease-fire was reached in a matter of hoiurs. A l l that remained 
now was for the respective superpowers to convince their allies i n the 
region of the validity of this proposal. I n a letter to Golda Meir, Kissinger 
wrote: 
"We believe that this is a major achievement for you and 
for us and supportive of the brave fighting of your forces. 
(First) It would leave your forces right where they are. 
(Second) There is absolutely no mention of the word 
'withdrawal' in the resolution; (third), for the first time, 
we have achieved the agreement of the Soviet Union to a 
resolution that calls for direct negotiation without 
conditions or qualifications between the parties under 
appropriate auspices." 19 
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A t this stage, i t is interesting to note the changes that occurred i n 
the positions of the participants i n the war, reflecting their relative 
strengths and weaknesses i n the conflict itself. I n the first week of the 
confl ict , the Uni t ed States stood alone i n its pursuit of an early 
settlement ( fol lowed later by Israel when the tide of the war d i d not 
appear to be t t iming i n its favoxir). Israel accepted a proposed settlement 
on 12 October, only for i t to be rejected the next day by Egypt. In the 
coming days this position was reversed. By the third week in October, 
the Soviet Union and Egypt were anxious to reach a settlement, whilst 
the Israelis were not. Nixon and Kissinger secured an Israeli agreement 
by suggesting that continued arms supplies would be in doubt without a 
cease-fire. I n light of this, the Israeli government reluctantly agreed. 
The proposed cease-fire was finally adopted on 22 October by 
the UNSC, w i t h i t reaff i rming the principles of Resolution 242 and 
concluding the current conflict i n the region. The most serious 
moment of the crisis was yet to come. The implementation of the 
cease-fire failed to cvirb fighting i n the region. The Israelis moved to 
surround the Egyptian Th i rd A r m y after Resolution 338 had been 
implemented, and the Egyptians responded. A day later. Resolution 
339 was passed, reiterating the resolution of the previous day (and it 
was only at this point that the Syrians actually announced their 
acceptance of the cease-fire). Yet, once again, there were clear 
violations by both the Egyptians and Israeli sides. A t this stage, 
Brezhnev proposed the dispatch of Soviet and American troops to 
the area to ensure compliance w i t h the resolution, but the letter 
delivered to Kissinger gave great cause for concern as i t contained the 
possibility of unilateral Russian intervention: 
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"...Let us together, the USSR and the United States 
urgently dispatch to Egypt, the Soviet and American 
contingents, to ensure the implementation of the decision 
of the Security Council of 22 and 23 concerning the 
cessation of fire and all military activities and also our 
understanding with you on the guarantee of the 
implementation of the decisions of the Security Council. 
It is necessary to adhere without delay. I will say it 
straight to you that if you find it impossible to act jointly 
with us in this matter, we should be faced with the 
necessity urgently to consider the question of taking 
appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow 
arbitrariness on the part of Israel."20 
The Nixon administration was now faced w i t h a serious problem. 
Sadat's expuls ion of the Soviets i n 1972 had been a welcome 
development for the United States, but the action proposed here, would 
put them back i n their position, with American consent! Yet, the refusal 
of the Soviet suggestion ran the risk of Soviet xmilateral action, and a 
possible superpower confrontation. As a consequence of this, for two 
days, the forces of the United States were on alert and the dangers of 
superpower confUct loomed. 
The adminis t ra t ion eventually decided to reject the Soviet 
proposals, as is demonstrated by Kissinger's response: 
'The United States does not favour and will not approve 
the sending of a joint Soviet-United States force into the 
Middle East. It is inconceivable that we should 
transplant the great power rivalry into the Middle 
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East...It would be a disaster if the Middle East, already 
torn by local rivalries, would now become, as a result of a 
UN decision, a legitimised theatre for the competition of 
the mihtary forces of the great powers" .21 
The situation was diffused by the Egyptian acceptance of a U N security 
force excluding the permanent members of the SC. I t had initially been 
the idea of the Egyptians for a force including the two superpowers and 
therefore, their acceptance of this compromise made i t easier for the 
Soviets to accept. I n accordance w i t h these developments. Resolution 
340 was adopted by the UNSC on 25 October 1973, which legislated the 
establishment of the Emergency Force. ( see Appendix E for details.) 
n 
The Yom Kippur war was instrxmiental i n bringing about a more 
radical and active American policy towards a settlement. Three 
fimdamental assumptions of the United States had been challenged: 
• The military balance remaining i n Israel's favour had not brought 
stability to the region. A n d i t was now apparent that Israeli 
strength alone wovild not result i n the desired political settlement. 
• Contrary to all expectations, the Arabs had fought well in the 
conflict crossing the Suez Canal, making early gains and had 
broken the myth of Israeli invincibility. 
106 
• The detente between the superpowers had failed to reduce the 
chance of regional conflict. 
The most crucial outcome of the 1973 war, i n American eyes, was 
that i t p roved inva l id the theory that a mi l i ta ry balance was the 
prerequisite for stabiHty i n the Middle East. Since 1967, a settlement of 
the conflict had been viewed by the United States as the most satisfactory 
way to protect American interests, but this goal had assumed a low 
priori ty whilst a relatively stable situation existed. The 1973 war radically 
changed these perceptions and a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
regarded as an important American issue. I n the post 1973 period, 
Kissinger, as bo th Secretary of State and National Security Adviser 
became the leading figure i n a prominent diplomatic campaign to ensure 
that a 'just and durable peace' was reached. 
For Israel, the effects were profound. The myth of Israeli military 
inv inc ib i l i ty had been shattered. Contrary to Israeli expectations 
fo l lowing the outcome of the Six Day War, the Arab soldiers fought well. 
Egyptian troops re-crossed the Suez Canal and Sadat became known as 
"the hero of the crossing." A n d although Israel eventually won the war, 
the psychological victory belonged to the Arab states. They had proved 
their f ight ing ability and had succeeded i n their main aim which was 
arguably to rejuvenate the stalled diplomatic process. Stewart Steven 
Suggests that for 36 hours, Israel was on the br ink of defeat.22 The 
unr iva l led reputat ion wh ich the Israeli intelligence commuruty had 
enjoyed i n the wake of the 1967 war was broken, and there was a general 
loss of confidence i n the abil i ty of the secret services to perform 
effectively. This loss of confidence was extended to the poli t ical 
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leadership as is illustrated by the fol lowing quote: 
'The Israeli public is engulfed in much confusion with 
regard to its stand vis-a-vis the political leadership."23 
The warning of war, when i t d id come, came too late to recall many of 
the regular troops already on leave for Yom Kippur, which left the Israeli 
army comprised predominantly of reservists. The Israeli army was, 
therefore left f ight ing f r o m a nvmierical and psychological disadvantage. 
While, ultimately Israel defeated the Arab states, the war brought grave 
problems for Israeli i n terms of unprecedented economic and military 
consequences. 
The impact of the war was perhaps increased by the proximity of 
the election. Originally planned for 23 October, i t was postponed after the 
start of the war xmtii 31 December. The true costs of the war were known 
then (although the economic consequences were only just begirming to 
be felt). Mil i tary losses and casualties i n the war had been tmprecedented 
w i t h 3,000 dead and an equal number wotmded, scores of planes were 
lost and also hundreds of tarJcs.24 These statistics alone were sufficient 
to provoke much unrest i n Israel, which was reflected i n the outcome of 
the 1973 election. I n the f inal result, the two major blocs. Labor and 
L ikud remained, but the Labor party's support was much reduced and, i n 
1977, i t was to be overtaken by the more radical and 'hawkish' L ikud 
coalition. Shortly after the 1973 election, Golda Meir put forward her 
resignation as PM, her government paying the ultimate price i n the 
fallout f r o m the 1973 war. 
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The post-war policies of the Uni ted States reflected the new 
priorities of the administration i n l ight of the events of 1973. Peace in 
the Middle East had always been a distant goal on the American foreign 
policy agenda, but now i t assumed a much larger role. Pollock identifies 
three goals for the United States i n this period; to reduce the dangers of 
another interruption i n the flow of oi l , lessen the chances of more Soviet 
penetration on the region and decrease the possibilities of another war.25 
Crucially, i n the long term, Israel's dependence upon the United 
States increased dramatically, a dependence that could be advantageous 
for the pursuit of American political objectives. Indeed, the carrot and 
stick approach became an integral part of American policy. The October 
war marked a new chapter i n American-Israeh relations. I n the few 
years prior to the war, the United States had transferred arms almost 
unconditionally to Israel, and the relationship had also extended to the 
defence industry itself. For example, i n December 1970, the two countries 
signed the Master Defense Development Data Exchange Agreement, 
g iv ing Israel access to technical in fo rmat ion f r o m which i t could 
manufacture.26 But, i n the years that followed 1973, aid came w i t h many 
strings attached. This can be effectively illustrate by the peace process 
that unfolded i n the months after the war. 
The f o r m a l f r a m e w o r k of the peace process, the Geneva 
Conference, opened i n December 1973, but became almost entirely 
ceremonial i n its role. A l t h o u g h i t played an important part by 
involv ing the Soviet Union i n the settlement process and legitimising 
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the process itself, its influence ended here and the real post-war 
diplomacy was dominated by Kissinger's step-by-step approach. Crucial 
to this approach was the leverage which could be used regarding the 
question of arms transfers to Israel. Three agreements were concluded 
between January 1974 and the end of 1975: 
• January 1974 - First Sinai disengagement treaty 
• June 1974 - Golan disengagement treaty 
• August 1975 - Second Sinai accord 
The transfer of arms played a principal part i n the diplomacy that 
preceded al l three. Pollock emphasises the role that arms transfers 
played i n these accords by suggesting that arms were designed to help 
replace the strategic territory i n the Sinai and the Golan Heights27 which 
Israel wou ld have to compromise on if agreement was to be reached. Of 
the three agreements, the one w i t h Syria was by far the most difficvilt, 
due to the security concerns involved. Not only were the Syrians 
engaging i n a miniwar of attrition and illegally holding prisoners of war, 
but f u l l possession of the Golan Heights by either Syria or Israel would 
represent a potential strategic threat to the other. Illustrating the role of 
arms and American aid, the day before Kissinger was due to f ly to 
Damascus to conclude the Golan treaty, Nixon reduced Israel's miUtary 
debt by one bi l l ion dollars. 
I n the diplomacy that took place fol lowing the war, the American 
role was preeminent. The actual negotiations were outside the formal 
f ramework established for peace and this guaranteed that the Soviet 
Union would remain on the sidelines of the peace process. Events were, 
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therefore, dictated to a large extent by American action. Russia had been 
effectively excluded f r o m the negotiations (although their position i n the 
region continued to be the focus of American interest) and Israel, i n the 
wake of the war, became increasingly dependent upon American 
generosity. 
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CONCLUSION 
To conclude, before returning to the six themes mentioned in the 
introduction, a number of general comments can be made about the 1967 
- 73 period. Throughout these six years, there were many common 
interests between Israel and the United States. For example, Israel's need 
fo r mi l i t a ry aid and equipment ( fo l lowing France's wi thdrawal of 
support) and the belief i n the United States that Israel could be a 'strategic 
asset' to her i n the Middle East - which led her to arm Israel heavily. 
This is not to suggest that differences d id not exist. I n the aftermath of 
the 1967 war, Israel sought both Arab acceptance of her right to exist and 
retain the occupied territories. The United States was committed to 
Israel's existence but, other interests i n the region (most importantly oil) 
necessitated that America take a more balanced approach to the search 
for a resolution of the conflict. For example, when presenting the Rogers 
Plan i n 1970, Secretary of State Rogers noted the problems in achieving 
peace and suggested that America would take a balanced approach to 
them: 
"Our pohcy is and will continue to be a balanced one. We 
have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. To call 
for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the United 
Resolution without achieving agreement on peace would 
be partisan towards the Arabs. To call on Arabs to accept 
peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan 
toward Israel. Therefore our policy is to encourage the 
Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding 
agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from the 
occupied territory when their territorial integrity is 
112 
assured as envisaged by the Security Council 
Resolution."! 
This balanced approach d i d at times lead to tension w i t h Israel as the 
United States cajoled her into compromise. But i n the long term, i t was 
the Arab states that felt they were making little progress towards their 
goal. As America continued to arm Israel heavily, there was l i t t le 
incentive for Israel to make the necessary territorial concessions to move 
the peace process forward. 
I n addit ion to these differences, domestic political considerations 
i n the two countries d i d much to irifluence the foreign policy agenda, 
wh ich again caused tension. I n an American election year. Middle 
Eastern policy was unl ike ly to feature highly unless considerable 
domestic political capital could be made. I n Israel the commitment of 
bo th the popula t ion and the pol i t ical elite to the retention of the 
occupied territories imposed considerable constraints upon those who 
w o u l d have compromised to achieve peace. W i t h these constraints i n 
mind, i t is the purpose of this conclusion to draw together the results of 
this study and look at the possible future implications for American-
Israeli relations. 
The changes that occurred fo l l owing the second w o r l d war 
significantly increased the influence of the United States i n wor ld affairs. 
Largely as a result of the war, Britain was no longer i n a position to 
sustain her international interests. Consequently, i n the late 1940s she 
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reUnquished her role i n Palestine and that of protecting Greece and 
Ttirkey. The rise of the Soviet Union i n Eastern and Central Etirope and 
the perceived threat that Communism posed became an important 
element i n US foreign policy making, as is illustrated i n the fol lowing 
quotation: 
"...unless we are wilUng to help free peoples to maintain 
their institutions and their national integrity against 
aggressive movements that seek to impose on them 
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank 
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free 
peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the 
fotmdations of international peace and hence the security 
of the United States."2 
Throughou t the 1967 - 73 per iod , relations between the 
superpowers had a significant impact i n shaping American policy 
towards the Midd l e East. This was especially true dur ing Nixon's 
presidency, when bo th N i x o n and Kissinger were predominantly 
concerned w i t h the containment of Soviet influence. In the aftermath of 
the Six Day War, Israel and the United States forged a closer relationship, 
w i t h both the scale and nature of American aid to Israel changing. A i d to 
Israel was increased significantly, and i n 1968, fighter planes (Phantom 
jets) were sold to Israel for the first time. These developments took place 
against a backdrop of the Soviet Union continuing to arm the Arab States 
heavily. Just as i n the prewar period, American Middle Eastern poUcy 
had been based on the maintenance of a military balance i n the region; 
after 1967, Israeli military superiority became seen as essential: 
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"Although the USSR has replaced a major portion of the 
Arab aircraft losses, the Arab effective capability is still 
far below that of Israel and in our judgment will remain so 
for some time" 3 
The post 1967 era saw an expansion of the Cold War into the 
M i d d l e East as Russia and the Uni ted States increasingly aligned 
themselves to the Arab States and Israel. I n this atmosphere the United 
States offered Israel a p l en t i fu l supply of credit and sophisticated 
weaponry. I n 1972, the Deputy Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco offered 
this explanation: 
"Yes our aid to Israel is immense, I admit that. But you 
must remember that America does not see the Middle East 
crisis as a question of Israel and the Arab countries, it sees 
it from the angle of the general political situation and its 
requirements"* 
Israel's performance i n the Six Day War d i d much to precipitate this. 
The belief of the United States that Israel was a 'strategic asset' i n the 
region and a barrier to Soviet expansion was cmcial i n determining the 
levels of aid that she received. Steven Isaacs has commented, w i t h 
regard to the Jewish Lobby, that: 
"Jewish activists on the Hill used the anti-Communist 
tool broadly for maintaining the support of Israel." 5 
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The Uni ted States has been associated w i t h Israel since its 
inception. Numerous reasons are suggested for the existence of the 
support that Israel has received including: 
• Historical (and to a certain extent emotional, following the second 
wor ld war) 
• The character of the Jewish state, i n that i t is similar to that of the 
United States (Western style democracy). This is especially 
important when compared to the Arab states of the Middle East. 
• A m o r a l responsibility to prevent the destruction of the Jewish 
state. 
On a practical level, the general support for the state of Israel wi th in the 
Uiuted States, both i n public opinion and the political elite, has resulted 
i n Israel receiving vast sums of aid f r o m America. Given the widespread 
support that exists w i t h i n the Uruted States, the success of the Jewish 
lobby should perhaps come as no surprise. But this support has not been 
the only factor determining the influence that the Jewish lobby has 
gained. The commitment of the American Jewish population to Israel 
has been crucial: 
This is not a lobby in the conventional sense...It is rather 
a commitment rooted in powerful bonds of kinship, in 
memory of a common history and the conviction of a 
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common destiny. The root strength of this most 
formidable of domestic political lobbies...lies not in its 
skills in public relations, access to the media or ample 
financing, although all of these are impressive, but in the 
solid, consistent, and usually unified support of the 
Jewish commimities of the United States."6 
This grassroot support maiufests itself in many ways, most significantly; 
h igh voter turnout i n elections, h igh involvement i n domestic politics 
generally and generous contributions to polit ical campaigns. AU of 
wh ich can assume crucial significance dur ing election times. This 
ind iv idua l Jewish commitment has been bui l t upon by a nimiber of 
highly organised and effective Jewish organisations and lobby groups, the 
most notable being the AIPAC. W i t h its focus on Congress, the AIPAC 
has been very successful i n gaining access to the political process: 
"AIPAC is very effective. They have a good grassroots 
operation which is vital. It can deliver letters, calls to 
members from their home state. At any given moment, it 
can mobilise." 7 
Cheryl Rubenberg expands on this theme by saying that 'the AIPAC 
possesses a computerised listing of supporters of Israel in every state and 
congressional district.'s Therefore, through a variety of di f ferent 
methods; supply of i n f o r m a t i o n ; scrutiny of Congressmen and 
relationships w i t h key individuals, the AIPAC has gained significant 
access to the polit ical process. Israel has found consistent support i n 
Congress and presidents have been unlikely to challenge the validity of 
this. I n the words of Seth Tillman: 
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"American presidents have sought to avoid a direct 
confrontation with Israel and its strong supporters in the 
United States because of the terrific domestic controversy 
sure to be engendered by such a face-off; because of the 
povk^ erful and apparently undiminished hold Israel and 
its supporters have upon Congress."^ 
m 
The 1967 war had a crucial impact on American-Israeli relations, 
i n that i t changed the aspirations of the Jewish state, and America's 
perception of the strategic role that Israel could play i n the Middle East. 
Prior to the war, the government of the state of Israel and its people were 
concerned for the very survival of the state. Following the closure of the 
Straits of Tiran, Yariv made the fol lowing comments: 
'The post Suez period is over. It is not merely a questions 
of freedom of navigation. If Israel does not respond to the 
closure of the straits, there v^ill be no value to its 
credibility, or to the IDF's deterrent power because the 
Arab states will interpret Israel's weakness as an 
excellent opportunity to assail her security and very 
existence." 10 
Yet, i n six days, the strategic and mil i tary balance w i t h i n the region 
altered significantly; both to the advantage of Israel. Israel had captured a 
large amount of Arab terr i tory and i n the period after the war, the 
question of what to do w i t h the land dominated the Israeli poUtical 
scene. I n the aftermath of the war, the captured territory became the 
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focus for pressure group activity. I n the period 1967 - 73, the Land of 
Israel Movement was the most dominant group acting to ensure that the 
territories were retained. A n d i n the late 1960s the rationale behind 
keeping the territories was put forward not only i n security terms, but 
also to preserve the bonds between the Jewish people and their ancient 
homeland, as is illustrated by the fol lowing quote by Moshe Dayan: 
"We have retxirned to the mountain, to the cradle of our 
people, to the inheritance of the Patriarchs, to the land 
of the Judges and the fortress of the kingdom of the House 
of David. We have returned to Hebron and Shechem, to 
Bethlehem and Anatst, to Jericho and the fords of the 
Jordan at Adam Ha'ir"" 
The Six Day War had made Israel territorially more sectire and in the 
immediate post war period, there was a great desire to retain the captured 
territories. 
Y Yishai has iden t i f i ed three ways i n w h i c h the occupied 
territories have affected Israel: 
• I n the wor ld arena, Israel has been denotmced for her continued 
occupation of the territories. 
• Regionally, there has been a change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Prior to 1967, the Arab states were imited i n opposition to the 
existence of the state of Israel. Since the Six Day War, the principal 
bone of contention has been the occupied territories, rather than 
the existence of Israel. Arab leaders have seen their return as 
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an essential condition for progress towards a solution of the 
conflict. 
• Domestically, continued occupation of the territories has involved 
an enlarged Arab poptdation Uving wi th in Israel.i2 
With in the context of the Cold War, Israel's performance i n the 
1967 war against her Arab neighbours was crucial to the United States. 
Since the Suez crisis of 1956 (when America had led the U N demands for 
Israeli w i thd rawa l f r o m the captured territories) there had been a 
significant policy reappraisal. This was largely due to the political 
instability i n the Middle East region at this time. I n the 1950s and 60s, 
there had been a large increase i n Arab nationaUsm and Soviet influence 
in the area was expanding. Prior to 1967 therefore, the United States was 
already looking towards Israel as a possible 'buffer ' against Soviet 
expansionism and, her performance i n the war validated this position. 
"In short, US support for Israel in 1967 v^ as premised upon 
the conviction that this was the best means of stemming 
the tide of Soviet penetration into the Middle East" 13 
Probably as a result of the Suez crisis, there had been strong support in 
Israel for gaining American backing before any IsraeU action was taken. 
Meir Amit ' s visit to Washington i n May was designed to achieve three 
things: 
• clarify, check and compare w i t h American intelligence 
information regarding mili tary and political developments 
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• clarify the mission of the special (naval) task force to handle 
Middle East affairs 
• clarify the USA reaction of Israel decided to act militarily.!4 
Crucially, A m i t came away f r o m the meeting seeing 'no differences 
between the Israeli and US appreciations of the mili tary situation.'is 
This belief was validated i n the American reaction to the 1967 war, when 
there was no repeat of the 1956 calls for withdrawal f rom the captured 
territory. 
The 1973 war was crucial both i n terms of the regional politics of 
the Middle East and American-Israeli relations. Key results were: 
• I t proved invalid the idea that Israeli military superiority would 
guarantee regional security 
• The performance of the Arab states broke the myth of Israeli 
invincibili ty, even though Israel d id eventually w i n the war 
• I n terms of superpower relations, the war brought the United 
States and the Soviet Union to the point of conflict and 
consequently proved the importance of f inding a peaceful 
solution to the coiiflict. 
There are a number of contrasts to be made between the wars of 
1967 and 1973. Israeli intelligence information had been crucial in 1967, 
w i t h the attack on the air forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan on 5 Jime 
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destroying 70-80% of the Arab air strength.16 I n 1973, Israeli intelligence 
had predicted a war, but i n May 1973, not October. A n d many prominent 
political and military figures continued to believe that as long as Israeli 
mil i tary superiority was maintained, the Arab states would not attack. 
Consequently, the simultaneous Arab attack that was launched placed 
the Israeli mil i tary at a great disadvantage. (This failure to predict the 
war came i n spite of a massive increase i n Soviet military aid to the Arab 
states. For example i n the first half of 1973, the USSR supplied Syria wi th 
$185 mi l l ion , wh ich was $35 milUon more than the total arms Syria 
received i n 1972.17) Abba Eban's comments also illustrate the extent to 
which the state of Israel believed that there would be no war: 
"Historians who read the Israeli newspapers published 
in the first days of October will be startled to find that 
there was no hint of any crisis, let alone imminent 
war."18 
Numerous American and Israeli analyses of the situation before October 
1973 agreed that whilst Syria and Egypt lacked the military capacity to 
retain their territory, there wou ld be no war. To a great extent, Sadat's 
motives were misunderstood. The fundamental objective of the war 
was not territorial gain, but the creation of a situation that wovild break 
the diplomatic stalemate that existed, and produce a more flexible Israeli 
approach. This proved invalid the theory that Israeli mihtary superiority 
wou ld guarantee stability i n the Middle East. The Arab states fought the 
1973 war i n the hope of rejuvenating the diplomatic process in spite of, 
on paper at least, their military disadvantage. 
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There were a number of important consequences fo l lowing on 
f r o m the Yom Kippur War. I n terms of the AIPAC, its efforts to secure 
fu tu re aid fo r Israel were redoubled. I n May 1974, the fo l lowing 
statement was issued: 
"The United States should continue to maintain an 
adequate defense posture. The October War demonstrated 
the critical importance of the American capacity to 
provide timely assistance to countries that are victims of 
aggression, through the supply of needed armaments, 
including aircraft, tanks, artillery and ammunition. We 
also recognise the value of American military' strength in 
deterring direct Soviet military involvement in the 
Middle East." 19 
The increase i n aid to Israel fol lowing the 1973 war was immense. Prior 
to 1973, Israel had been twenty four th amongst post v^ai recipients of 
American foreign aid, but i n just six years, she became the second largest 
received of combined economic and military assistance (and was soon to 
overtake South Vietnam.20) During the war, Nixon had proposed (and 
Congress approved) a $2.2 biUion programme of military credits to pay 
for aircraft and tanks that had been sent to Israel. This was especially 
important as i t was the first time that Israel had received a military grant 
as opposed to a loan. This was to become increasingly common in the 
post 1973 period. 
I n the decade fo l lowing the war, the United States became the 
most important source of foreign assistance for Israel. I n this climate, 
both Nixon and Ford used the scale of foreign assistance as leverage to 
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mauce Israeli territorial concessions, i n the war of 1973, the first effective 
use of o i l as a weapon and the close p rox imi ty of superpower 
confrontation had reinforced the need to f i n d a resolution to the Arab 
Israeli conflict . But, the Israeli lobby was also using the strategic 
importance of Israel to make the case for maintaining the levels of 
foreign aid. I n 1975, the A I F A C sent a detailed memorandum to all 
Congressmen explaining why US aid to Israel was i n America's national 
interest: 
'The Arab slaies will never make peace wilh a weakened 
Israel ihey feel tan be defeaied uiiliiarily and Israel 
caiuioi make ruriuer coiicessiuus if her iiaiiuiial seturiiy is 
endangered. "21 
Israel's strategic position and security, had, by this time become an 
integral feature of American-Israeli relations. This, i n addition to the 
importance of domestic American politics i n foreign policy making, d id 
to some extent, tie the hands of the policymakers. A n d whilst the carrot 
and stick approach was used to induce Israeli concessions, Israel's 
geographic location ensured ultimate American support. As regards aid, 
whilst the aftermath of the 1967 war saw American aid to Israel nourish, 
i t was not un t i l the outcome of the Yom Kippur war that the quantum 
leap f r o m loans to outright grants was made, and Israel became the 
Uiuted States' number one recipient of foreign assistance. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIXA 
Letter from the agent of the Provisional Government of Israel to the 
President of the United States, 15 May 1948. 
M y dear Mr . President: I have the honour to notify you that the state of 
Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic w i t h i n the 
frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 
resolution of 29 November 1947, and that a provisional government has 
been charged to assume the rights and duties of goverimient for 
preserving law and order w i t h i n the boundaries of Israel, for defending 
the state against external aggression and for discharging the obUgations of 
Israel to the other nations of the w o r l d i n accordance w i t h international 
law. The Act of Independence w i l l become effective at one minute after 
six o'clock on the evening of 14 May, Washington time. 
W i t h f u l l knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed 
and has been strengthened over the past th i r ty years between the 
government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I 
have been authorised by the provisional government of the new state to 
tender this message and to express the hope that your government w i l l 
recognise and w i l l welcome Israel into the commvmity of nations. 
Very Respectftilly Yours, 
Eliahu Epstein 
Agent, Provisional Govenmient of Israeli 
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APPENDIX B 
United States Proposal For A Temporary United Nations Trusteeship For 
Palestine. 
Statement by President Truman, 25 March 1948. 
It is vi ta l that the American people have a clear understanding of the 
position of the United States i n the U N regarding Palestine. 
This country vigorously supported the plan for partition w i t h economic 
union recommended by UNSCOP and by the General Assembly. We 
have explored every possibility w i t h the basic principles of the Charter 
for giving effect to that solution... 
The U K has announced its f i r m intention to abandon its mandate i n 
Palestine on 15 May . Unless emergency action is taken there w i l l be no 
public authority on Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and 
order. Violence and bloodshed w i l l descend upon the Holy Land. Large-
scale f ight ing among the people of that country w i l l be the inevitable 
resxilt. Such f ighting would infect the entire Middle East and could lead 
to consequences of the gravest sort involving the peace of this nation 
and the wor ld . 
These dangers are imminent . Responsible governments i n the U N 
carmot face this prospect wi thout acting promptly to prevent i t . The 
United States has proposed to the Security Council a temporary United 
Nations trusteeship for Palestine to provide a goverimient to keep the 
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peace. Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitution for the partition plan 
but as an effort to fUl the vacuum soon to be created by the termination 
of the mandate on May 15... i 
NOTES: 
Text of document taken f r o m A Decade of American Foreign 
Policy. Basic Doctmients 1941-1949, Department of State, 
Washington, 1985, p 711 
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APPENDIX C 
RESOLUTION 242: Adopted by the UNSC 22 November 1967. 
The Security Council: 
Expressing its continuing concern w i t h the grave situation on the 
Middle East. 
Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war 
and the need to work for a just and lasting peace i n which every state in 
the area can live i n security. 
Emphasising further that all member states i n their acceptance of the 
Charter of the Uruted Nations have undertaken a commitment to act i n 
accordance w i t h Article 2 of the Charter. 
1) Affirms that the fu l f i lmen t of the Charter principles requires the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace i n the Middle East which shotild 
include the fo l lowing principles: 
i) Withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces f rom the territories 
occupied i n the recent conflict 
i i ) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for 
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State i n the area and their right to 
live i n peace wi th in secure and recognised botmdaries free f rom 
threats or acts of force 
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2) Affirms further the necessity: 
a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international 
water-ways i n the area 
b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem 
c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviability and political 
independence of every State i n the area, through measures 
including the establishment of demilitarised zones 
3) Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative 
to proceed to the Middle East to estabUsh and maintain contact w i t h the 
States concerned i n order to promote agreement and assist efforts to 
achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement i n accordance w i t h the 
provisions of this resolution. 
4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Coimcil on 
the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as 
possible. 1 
Given the distance between the parties involved w i t h i n the region. 
Resolution 242 was necessarily a masterpiece of ambiguity and debate 
continues as to its precise meaning, centring upon whether the 
Resolution specifies withdrawal f r o m territories or the territories (eg. all 
those captured i n the 1967 war.) Here, the English and French versions 
differ , the latter referring \.o the territories. Al though Resolution 242 
was a British text, the languages have equal status as official languages of 
the SC and so whilst the original text was submitted in English, the doubt 
to its precise meaning remains. 
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APPENDIX D 
The Principles of the Rogers' Initiarive 
The principles of the Rogers' Initiative were contained in a letter from 
Jarring notifying the Secretary-general that Israel, Jordan and Egypt had 
consented to the commitments contained in the letter. 
"The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree: 
a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out 
Resolution 242 in all its parts, they wi l l designate representatives to 
discussions to be held under my auspices according to such procedure 
and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as 
appropriate each sides experience between the parties. 
b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach 
agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them 
based on :-
1) mutual acknowledgement by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of 
each other's sovereignty territorial integrity and political 
independence 
2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, 
both in accordance with Resolution 242. 
c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in 
Resolution 242 the parties wi l l strictly observe, effective July 1 at least 
untU October 1, the cease-fire resolution of the Security Coimcil" i 
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1. Text taken from Y Rabin, (1979), p 138 
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APPENDIX E 
RESOLUTION 340: Adopted by the UNSC 25 October 1973. 
This Resolution was the necessary legislation to establish a UN 
Emergency Force for the Middle East. 
The Seciirity Council: 
Recalling its resolutions 338 of 22 October 1973 and 339 of 23 October 1973. 
Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in 
non-compliance with Resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). 
Noting with concern from the Secretary-general's report that the UN 
military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both 
sides of the cease-fire line. 
1) Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that 
the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 16:50 hours GMT 
on 22/10/73. 
2) Requests the Secretary-general, as an immediate step, to increase the 
ntimber of UN military observers on both sides. 
3) Decides to set up immediately under its authority, a United Nations 
Emergency force to be composed of personnel drawn from state members 
of the U N except the permanent members of the Security Coimcil, and 
requests the Secretary General to report within 24 hours on the steps 
taken to this effect. 
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4) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council on an virgent 
and continuing basis on the state of implementation of this resolution as 
weU as Resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). 
5) Requests aU member states to extend their fxill cooperation to the 
United Nations in the implementation of this resolution as well as 
Resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). i 
NOTES: 
1. Text taken from M Medzini Ed. Israel's Foreign Relations. 
Selected Doctmients 1947-74, Jerusalem, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1976, p 1061-2 
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